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“Gatekeepers” Are Vital Participants in Anti-Money-Laundering Laws and 
Enforcement Regimes as Permission-less Blockchain-Based Transactions Pose 
Challenges to Current Means to “Follow the Money”  
by 
Sarah Jane Hughes⸸ 
 
† Sarah Jane Hughes is the University Scholar and Fellow in Commercial Law at the Maurer School of 
Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.  She recently served as the Reporter for the Uniform Law 
Commission’s Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act (2017) and the Uniform 
Supplemental Commercial Law for the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act (2018).  
From 2000 to 2002, she was the American Bar Association’s Advisor to the Uniform Law Commission’s 
Money Services Business Act.  Professor Hughes has written and given presentations about the deterrence 
and detection of money laundering since 1992 and has published numerous articles about virtual-currency 
service providers and the manner of their regulation since 2011. Her first work on electronic payment 
systems was published in 1997, shortly after early virtual currency and mobile payments efforts in the 
United States occurred.  She is an elected member of the American Law Institute, and prior to joining the 
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financial privacy. SSRN=408848. 
The research for this essay was conducted from late 2018 through FATF’s approval in June 2019 of new 
rules for cryptocurrencies, which are discussed in this essay.  The majority of the research was completed 
by May 31, 2019. Readers should anticipate that, given the pace of change in blockchain technologies and 
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research.  
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works are mentioned in this essay. Despite so many helpful comments and extant work in this field on 
which to draw, Professor Hughes claims all errors in the pages that follow.  
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I. Introduction 
Two phenomena dominate reports about blockchain-based transactions—that they will disrupt 
and displace legacy banking, securities, and trade intermediaries, and that they present new or greater 
opportunities for hiding proceeds of crimes or corruption. This essay does not deal with the former 
topic. Rather, the organizers of the symposium at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia School of 
Law asks me to consider the latter question. It proved to be a tough assignment.   
This essay looks at the separate questions of (1) the degree to which permission-less blockchain 
transactions will disrupt current anti-money laundering (AML) regimes and enforcement efforts, and (2) 
what efforts governments that have agreed to pursue goals of deterrence and detection of money 
laundering may need to initiate as blockchain-based transactions become more common.  
My thought process has moved through stages and, finally, has focused on three silos of 
potential concerns about blockchain technologies. In the first silo are blockchain technologies as 
technologies. I assign to this first silo the lowest level of concerns because of their potential for 
inclusion, security and integrity. I do not favor regulating technologies; such regulation will be outdated 
too fast.  
The second silo contains cryptocurrencies and other crypto-assets or products and services 
related to them that are offered in compliance with applicable domestic laws where the user of the 
product or services is domiciled.  I assign a low-to-low-middle level of concern to these crypto assets but 
recognize and discuss below that this “grade” could change.   
In the third silo, I have bad actors whose products and services are designed for illicit purposes, 
and opportunists that offer products and services they do not have and that have no intention of 
delivering products or services or allowing redemption of value delivered to them.  This third silo gets a 
big red flag from me – and this silo will require continued attention from domestic and global law 
enforcement agencies. 
Part of the reason that I see a low or low-to-low-middle level of concern for the first two silos is 
that, for the immediate future at least, that traditional financial services “gatekeepers” in payments, 
securities, and commodities will continue to play vital roles in deterring and detecting money laundering 
and terrorism finance efforts here and abroad. The presence of regulated “gatekeepers” may not 
forestall the need for new legal requirements or enforcement systems forever, but their presence in the 
marketplaces of today reduce the need for immediate action and allow legislatures and regulators more 
time to observe crypto innovations and determine their next steps.  
As a subset of the third silo, for the time being at least, are the new brands of government-
backed cryptocurrencies, such as the Petro from Venezuela and those that Russia, China, and other 
governments, and the special challenges they may pose to AML legal regimes and, separately, to the 
United States Dollar as the global reserve currency that it has represented since World War II. These 
government-backed cryptocurrencies also challenge longstanding concepts of sovereigns’ control over 
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“legal tender” 1 inside their own borders and their potential sponsors are designing them to avoid 
economic sanctions imposed by other governments. 
The balance of this essay proceeds as follows: Part II provides background on permission-less 
blockchains and, separately, recent interest by governments in issuing cryptocurrencies themselves.  
Part III provides background on the three stages of value laundering – (1) initial “placement” of illicit 
proceeds, (2) “layering” through multiple forms of property or banks or banking systems to obscure its 
source or ownership, and (3) “integration” or emergence of assets that look legitimate to the outsider.  
Part IV reviews different challenges to traditional means of detecting value laundering that non-
government-issued cryptocurrencies, permission-less blockchains, and government-sponsored 
cryptocurrencies pose.  This Part looks at the vital roles that “gatekeepers” play in AML enforcement in 
the United States.  Part IV also explains how (1) regulators and law enforcement authorities are already 
using new tools to trace and identify blockchain-based transactions that are in furtherance of illicit 
activities, and (2) government-issued cryptocurrencies and more private and opaque cryptocurrencies 
may make detection of money laundering more difficult. Part V explains my view that permission-less 
blockchains are not our major problem in the global campaigns against money laundering (regardless of 
the purposes for which money laundering is attempted) but finding someone to regulate in future may 
be.  
Part VI briefly evaluates efforts by global authorities, such as the G-20’s Financial Action Task 
Force (“FATF”) regarding the regulation of cryptocurrencies and the European Parliament’s 5th Anti-
Money Laundering Directive (“AMLD5”), some of which goes into effect on January 10, 2020,2 to re-
frame the AML and market-protection regulatory recommendations to cover issues relating to 
cryptocurrencies and other crypto-assets.   
Part VII states some conclusions and identifies questions for additional research.  
II. Permission-less Blockchains, Cryptocurrencies and Other Crypto-Assets, and Special 
Issues Raised by Government-sponsored Cryptocurrencies 
Cryptocurrencies and crypto-assets on permission-less blockchains offer time-stamped publicly 
viewable records of transfers of rights that rely on peer-to-peer distributed “servers to generate 
computational proof of the chronological order of transactions” that itself is “secure as long as 
honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker 
nodes.”3 
This Part looks at types of blockchain technologies, potential risks associated with some 
cryptocurrencies and crypto-assets, and special issues raised by government-sponsored cryptocurrencies.  
                                                          
1 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2018) (“United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes 
of Federal reserve banks and national banks),” legally served to pay debts, charges, taxes, and dues, originally from 
the Coinage Act of 1965).  
2 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 
2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering or terrorist 
financing and amending Directive 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EU relevance), at para. 53, Document 
32018L0843, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/843/oj. 
3 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 1 (undated), www.bitcoin.org (allowing 
electronic payment systems to work based on “cryptographic proof … without the need for a trusted third party”) 
[hereinafter “Nakamoto”]. 
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Before proceeding, it is important to establish a baseline understanding of what a blockchain is.  I asked 
three experts from different backgrounds about the terms “distributed ledger technologies” and 
“blockchain.”  These three views are shown in the order in which I received them: 
Patrice Lyons, a technology attorney based in Reston, Virginia and Washington, D.C., responded: 
From my perspective, a blockchain is considered a “digital entity” (see definition in 
…ITU-T Recommendation X.1255), and there are many ways of configuring digital 
entities in this context. The origins of this technology go back many years …4 
My co-panelist at the “Smart Regulation” Public Policy Conference, Peter A. Wayner, a 
programmer and author of several books on cryptocurrencies and blockchains, has explained a blockchain 
as: 
A chain of blocks that track the sequence of transactions for cryptocurrencies provide a 
unique opportunity for public analysis of spending patterns. While the nominal identity of 
each person is not recorded as a human readable name or common identification value 
like the Social Security number, the public key used to sign the transaction can provide 
much of the same value.  All of the transactions associated with the key of a particular 
person are easy to find on the blockchain I the publicly accessible information. Even if 
the transactions are routed through different exchanges or intermediaries, all of the 
cryptocoins that flow through the wallet can be flagged.5 
 Michigan State University’s Professor Carla Reyes explains distributed ledger technologies, 
which are broader than the universe of blockchains, as follows: 
... uses the [distributed ledger technology or DLT] to refer generally to ‘computer 
software that is distributed, runs on peer-to-peer networks, and offers a transparent, 
verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-management system maintained through a 
consensus mechanism rather than by a trusted third-party intermediary that guarantees 
execution.”6 
In simplified terms, then, a blockchain is a method of storing records of ownership or of assets and 
transactions that uses a version of a distributed ledger.7  A distributed ledger keeps records “in many 
                                                          
4 Patrice A. Lyons, email to Sarah Jane Hughes, June 8, 2019 4:53 PM.  Copy on file with Sarah Jane Hughes. Ms. 
Lyons also directs attention to the term “Digital entity data model” in ITU-T Recommendation X. 1255 at § 7.1, 
which focuses on “[t]he essential fixed attribute of a DE is its associated unique persistent identifier ….” This, she 
explains, is “an evolution in the technology of the early Internet where IP addresses resolve to ports on machines.”  
Patrice A. Lyons, email to Sarah Jane Hughes, June 11, 2019 4:10 PM. Copy on file with Sarah Jane Hughes. Ms. 
Lyons is affiliated with the Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI) in Reston, VA.  For further, highly 
useful analysis, see Patrice A. Lyons and Robert E. Kahn, Blocks as digital entries: A standards perspective, in NFAIS 
Conference: Blockchain for Scholarly Publishing (Bonnie Lawlor, ed.), 38 J. Inform. Servs. & Use, 173-185 (2018), 
https://content.iopress.com.443/journals/information-services-and-use.  
5 See Peter A. Wayner, HANDBOOK OF OPTICAL PROPERTIES: DIGITAL CASH: COMMERCE ON THE NET, 2 (AP Professional 1997). 
6 Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373, 379-380 & n. 21 & 28 (2019) [hereinafter 
“Reyes 2019”]. For additional background, see Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Crypto Law, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 390-
91 (2017). 
7 See Artemis Caro, BLOCKCHAIN: THE BEGINNERS GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN & 
CRYPTOCURRENCY 12 (Cryptonaire Press, 2018).  
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different locations simultaneously.”8 And a distributed ledger theoretically is auditable, verifiable, and 
transparent.  
A. Distinctions Between “Permissioned” and “Permission-less” Blockchains 
A matrix of blockchains would reveal several options: public and less public “permission-less” 
blockchains and permissioned blockchains. It is important to differentiate these forms of blockchains for 
a variety of reasons.  
1. Public, permission-less blockchains 
In a public, permission-less blockchain, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, all participants are 
theoretically equal.9 There is no centralized management or authority that can be required by law to 
report data or keep a set of records prescribed by a government other than those inherent to their 
business model, or even any central authority to respond to legal process. The exception to this 
“equality” principle is that some participants play key roles in validating transactions on the blockchain, 
including “miners” of bitcoins who perform verification and validation functions but are not known to all 
participants. (The subject of the unknowable validators of public, permission-less blockchains is 
discussed by Professor Angela Walch in the paper she presented at the May 2019 “Smart Regulation” 
Public Policy Conference, which at the time was entitled “Intermediaries Who Must Not Be Named? The 
Keepers of the Public Blockchain.”10) 
Transactions on public blockchains are all open-to-view and relatable to each other in a chain.  
They are time-stamped. One can follow a chain of transfers from the first entry to the latest entry in 
time, and to ascribe to the last entry the status of being the “owner” or custodian of the related crypto 
assets at that time. It also is possible to follow transfers from one address to another by comparing the 
relative lengths of the chains with similar initial addresses to the current “owner” or custodian.  My co-
panelist, Peter A. Wayner, demonstrated how the public can follow transactions at the “Smart 
Regulation” Public Policy Conference. 
2. Public, permissioned blockchains 
  A public, permissioned blockchain is a category under which EOS and Ripple belong.  Some 
participants in this category of blockchain are more equal than others.11 The network appoints certain 
participants to be privileged over others.12 These participants can run the node, and they have abilities 
not shared by the general public.13 Key features of these blockchains is the ability of the privileged 
participants to keep certain records. For this reason, privilege holders on these networks might be 
required to report specific types of records of customers and transactions or to respond to legal process.  
                                                          
8 See id., at 12.  
9 See Arnold Daniels, “The rise of private permissionless blockchains-part 1, October 18, 2018,  
https://medium.com/ltoneetwork/the-rise-of-private-blockchains-part-1-4c39bea2e2be (hereinafter “Daniels”). 
10 Angela Walch, Intermediaries Who Must Not Be Named? The Keepers of the Public Blockchain, draft paper 
presented at the Public Policy Conference on Smart Regulation and the Future of Financial Services Regulation, 
Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, May 16, 2019.  Copy available from Professor Walsh, at 
awalsh@stmarytx.edu. 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
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A public, permissioned blockchain is one source of future public records systems, such as those for 
recording ownership of tangible property or providing public notice of security-interest claims. 
The third and fourth categories are private blockchains, which are not the focus of this essay. 
The discussion below, accordingly, is for completeness of description.   
3. Private, permission-less blockchains 
A private, permission-less blockchain has nodes that “will only acknowledge [other nodes’ 
existence], but not share any data” with them to this point in time.14  
One attraction of the private, permission-less blockchains is that each “smart contract” that may 
be used “automatically creates a private (side-) chain associated with that contact.”15 In addition, 
although a node may hold more than one “side-chain,” one node will not hold all of those in existence 
for the larger chain.  
Each node still operates as a repository.16 Only designated persons or organizations get 
permission to read specific nodes; designated persons will require cryptographic signatures to gain 
access to reading.17 To have reading privileges, one needs both the unique identifier (address) and the 
URL of the node that has a copy of the smart contract and associated chain.18 Also, each node will hold 
only data needed to service its users – an “agent-centric” solution.19 These chains inside private chains 
make the task of ferreting out specific transactions more complicated because they are not visible.   
These blockchains represent more powerful opportunities to hide assets because “smart 
contracts on these private networks, not only define who is allowed to perform contract actions but also 
who is allowed to read the contract and all related data.”20 First, the “smart contract” manages any 
contract actions required and created by this node, making it an ideal “location” from which to move 
those assets in the intermediate “layering” steps needed for traditional money laundering.  Owners of 
crypto assets on private, permission-less blockchains are not likely to spend them outside a narrow 
sphere of prospective counterparties. This narrow sphere of prospective counterparties and the 
restrictions on permissions help protect the identities of users of these blockchains.  
Experimentation with private, permission-less blockchains has been limited so far. As of October 
2018, one commentator, Arnold Daniels, had identified only three chains – the Holochain, LTO Network, 
and Monet. Holochain allows “users share information peer-to-peer on a need-to-know basis.”21 The 
LTO Network is Daniels’ own project: it “run[s] trustless workflows, targeting multinationals and 
governments…. The process has a strong focus on privacy and GDPR compliance.”22 The last, as of 
February 2019, is Monet.  Monet may be the most likely to be used to hide proceeds of financial crimes: 
it allows users to build “ad-hoc, short-lived chains, with mobile devices acting as nodes for the 
                                                          
14See id. at 2.  
15 Id. (emphasis original).  
16 Id.  
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. at 2-3.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 3. 
22 Id. 
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participants.”23  Other crypto assets are in development that will enhance privacy protections for 
users.24 
Private, permission-less blockchains share features with a cluster of “burn phones” or “bearer” 
instruments -- each facilitating the placement, layering or re-emergence of the assets or transactions 
involved. Daniels’ observations cemented this image: “Collaborations are fluid as both participants come 
and go and nodes may be discovered based on location.”25  Private, permission-less blockchains offer a 
lava-lamp-like fluidity of opportunity, a nearly perpetual series of opportunities to share data with only 
those with a need-to-know for a phase or a part of a part of a transfer or storage of assets.  These 
blockchains certainly appear to be more powerful potential tools for money launderers than any bearer 
bond or other bearer instrument – based outsiders at least know who the issuer of the instrument is 
because that party is named in the instrument.  This does not mean that all private, permission-less 
blockchains are designed for nefarious purposes.  It means that they bear watching as they develop.  
4. Private, permissioned blockchains 
The last category is a private, permissioned blockchain.  This category includes examples such as 
include Hyperledger Fabric and the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance.26 How do these systems handle 
permissions?  We look again to “smart contracts,” which “do define permissions.”27 Using a private, 
permission-less network drives some of the activity to a private “side-chain” – one associated with a 
“smart contract,” in particular.28  
This private, permissioned category both enables assets to be moved when a pre-established 
event coded at inception of a relationship or series of transactions triggers the next phase of the 
transaction and to be stored in an environment in which it likely will be harder for an outsider to 
observe them, but that allows the assets to be moved via “smart contracts” and transfer onwards.  
Accordingly, this fourth category – like the third – creates new opportunities to use blockchains and 
“smart contracts” to transact financial crimes or launder assets to emergence in “clean” form on pre-
established timetables or the occurrence of the prescribed event.  Will these transactions be observable 
in the open at all?  It seems that they are not intended to be.  
However, as I discuss later, when it comes time to exchange the assets for tangible assets or 
bank credits, the legacy entities – my “gatekeepers” -- that laws here and elsewhere currently requires 
to know-their-customers, maintain records, and report certain types of transactions—will face civil and 
criminal liabilities if they do not comply with applicable legal requirements.  
Permissioned blockchains are not the focus of this essay, however. The requirement of 
permission to use these blockchains takes them out of the scope of the assignment that Professors 
Vartanian and Ledig asked me to undertake.  Where “permission” is required, a key feature of other 
blockchains – their lack of centralized management of the technology and the records that contributes 
                                                          
23 Id.  
24 Peter Van Valkenburg, conversation with Sarah Jane Hughes, May 17, 2019. No transcript of this conversation is 
available.  
25 Id. at 4. 
26 Id. at 2.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
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to trust and integrity of records – is not present. Private, permissioned blockchains also offer 
opportunities to replace current databases of records, including those created and managed by banks 
and securities firms. 
B. Special Issues Raised by Government-sponsored Cryptocurrencies  
Governments such as the Russia Federation have spoken publicly of their intentions to create 
“official cryptocurrencies.”29 Russia’s announced purpose is to thwart economic sanctions imposed on 
Russian organizations and citizens.30  
It is unclear whether governments such as Russia that sponsor cryptocurrencies will use their 
sovereign rights to deem their sponsored cryptocurrencies as “legal tender,” the legal means to pay 
taxes and debts.31 If not, this cryptocurrency might operate only as an external currency, not for 
domestic purposes, such as China’s current, external-only version of the yuan or renminbi, referred to as 
the CYH.32 It also is unclear whether owners of Russia’s cryptocurrency will be allowed to exchange it for 
rubles, Russia’s legal tender.  
Russia and China also have indicated their plans to issue gold-backed cryptocurrencies for their 
own internal or external-trade reasons.33 Another goal is to replace the US Dollar as the world’s reserve 
currency.34 Russia’s has used cryptocurrencies such as the Venezuela-government owned Petro,35 itself 
                                                          
29 See Rachel McIntosh, Oil-Backed Cryptocurrency Could Hit Russian Markets Soon, FINANCEMAGNETS.COM (February 
25, 2019 8:48 GMT+1), https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/oil-backed-cryptocurrency-
could-hit-russian-markets-soon/.  
30 See Helen Partz, Russia’s Central Bank to Consider Gold-Backed Cryptocurencies for Mutual Settlements, 
COINTELEGRAPH.COM, May 23, 2019, https://cointelegraph.com/news/russias-central-bank-to-consider-gold-backed-
cryptocurrencies-for-mutual-settlements (citing Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Russia Central Bank, giving testimony 
before the Duma).  
31 The Case of Mixed Money in Ireland, Trin. 2 James I. a.d. 1605 (Davies’s Reports) (upholding the sovereign’s  
authority to make, change or debase its money as well as it designation of “mixed money” as legal tender for 
payments of taxes and debts; establishing a value that some of the governed found to their disadvantage; and 
clarifying that the definition of legal tender is “the stamp, the prince, and the value”).  For a recent discussion of 
methods that the U.S. has used to thwart competition to the dollar, see Stephen T. Middlebrook and Sarah Jane 
Hughes, Substitutes for Legal Tender: Lessons from History for the Regulation of Virtual Currencies, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW, Edward Elgar, 2016, Paper 316, Indiana Legal Studies Research Papers, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per-id=408848.  
32 Jeremy Cook, Why does China have two currencies? at 1 (March 14, 2018), 
https://www.worldfirst.com/uk/blog/international-business/foreign-exchange-international-business/china-two-
currencies/.  
33 See Daniel Palmer, Russian Central Bank to Consider Gold-Backed Cryptocurrency, INDESK.COM, MAY 23, 2019 14:30 
UTC,  https://www.coindesk.com/russian-central-bank-to-consider-gold-backed-cryptocurrency; Sean Adl-
Tabatabai, Russia and China Roll Out 100% Gold-Backed Currency, March 25, 2018, https://newspunch.com/russia-
china-gold-backed-currency/.  
34 Id. 
35See Sujha Sundararanajan, Venezuelan President announces oil-backed cryptocurrency, COINDESK.COM (December 
4, 2017 4:15 UTC, updated 8:14 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/venezuelan-president-announces-petro-oil-
backed-cryptocurrency.  
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on the U.S. Treasury Department’s SDN list,36 to help Venezuela evade U.S. economic sanctions,37 or to 
assist Russia’s operations in Crimea,38 suggest the scope of this threat. 
Cryptocurrencies, given the speed at which transfers can be settled compared with legacy bank 
transfers, also enhance risks associated with rapid movements of values from nation to nation and could 
contribute to broader instability in world markets and national economies. Use of crypto assets to avoid 
national securities regulatory regimes or to engage in market manipulation is also worrisome.39 
However, depending on the location of the owners of these Russian or Chinese 
cryptocurrencies, the opportunity to locate assets and trace beneficial ownership may still exist. When 
the owners seek to move this wealth into more stable financial systems in Europe or Asia than those 
from which they come, they are likely to require services of one or more “gatekeeper” intermediaries 
subject to the “Four R’s.” For example, investigations of Danske Bank and Deutsche Bank reveal that 
Russian oligarchs using banks in Estonia, Denmark, and elsewhere have transferred wealth to more 
stable banking systems and onwards to invest in real estate and other assets.40  Movement of funds into 
more stable financial systems in the EU, Canada or the United States are examples of safety-seeking and 
the “emergence” or integration that is the last stage of money laundering.  
III. Background on Money Laundering Methods 
                                                          
36  President Donald J. Trump, , Executive Order 13827 of March 19, 2018, Taking Additional Steps to Address the 
Situation in Venezzuela, March 19, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-
taking-additional-steps-address-situation-venezuela/ [hereinafter “Executive Order 13827-Venezuela”].  For 
additional discussion, see Nikhilesh De, Trump orders new sanctions against Venezuela’s crypto, WWW.CONDESK.COM 
(March 19, 2018 17:00 UTC, updated March 20, 2018 8:59 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/trump-orders-new-
sanctions-against-venezuelas-national-cryptocurrency. 
37 See Simon Shuster, Exclusive: Russia Secretly Helped Venezuela Launch a Cryptocurrency to Evade U.S. Sanctions,    
TIME.COM, March 20, 2018, https://time.com/5206835/exclusive-russia-petro-venezuela-cryptocurrency/ 
(describing the Petro as a “joint venture” between Venezuela and Russia to avoid U.S. sanctions and describing a 
September 2017 white paper explaining how cryptocurrencies could “overcome the dominance of Western 
currencies” and displace the U.S. Dollar).  
38 Helen Partz, Adviser to President of Russia Proposes Digital Currency in Crimea, COINTELEGRAPH.COM (April 22, 
2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/adviser-to-president-of-russia-proposes-digital-currency-in-crimea 
(quoting Sergey Glazyev who opined that the cryptocurrency was to reduce “cross-border barriers” and attract 
foreign investors who “are afraid of sanctions”). 
39 See generally, Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web of 
Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262 (2014), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1951148.  
40 See Richard Milne and Daniel Winter, Danske: anatomy of a money laundering scandal, FIN.TIMES.COM (DEC. 19, 
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/519ad6ae-bcd8-11e8-94b2-17176fbf93f5 (mentioning Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase and reporting events from 2007 until 2015; JPMorgan Chase apparently exited correspondent banking for the Estonia branch in 2013 for dollar-denominated transactions, citing concerns with non-resident customers of the branch) [hereinafter “Milne and Winter”]; See Bradley Hope, Patricia 
Kowsmann, and Drew Hinshaw, U.S. Probes Danish Bank Over Russia Money Flows, WALL ST. J. at A8 (Sept. 15-16, 2018) (reporting that the SEC received a confidential whistleblower complaint about Danske Bank AS’ involvement in laundering of $150 billion through accounts of non-Estonian account holders at a tiny Danske Bank branch in Estonia, and implicating Deutsche Bank and Citigroup with transactions into and out of the Estonian branch) [hereinafter “Hope, Kowsmann, and Hinshaw”]. Both articles reveal how lax internal anti-money-laundering controls and management attitudes contributed to the duration of the behavior being investigated. 
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Money laundering is “the concealment of the existence, nature or illegal source of illicit funds in 
such a manner that the funds appear legitimate if discovered.”41 The deterrence-and-detection legal 
requirements and enforcement tools are aimed at three stages used to complete the laundering of 
funds and at the persons, enterprises, and methods involved:  
▪ placement, “in which illicit proceeds are introduced into the financial system;” 
▪ layering “in which the criminal attempts to separate the proceeds from the crime through a 
series of transactions”; and  
▪ integration “where the illicit funds re-enter the economy disguised as legitimate funds.”42  
For any reader less familiar with these steps in money laundering, this Part includes a brief discussion of 
each stage. This essay also uses publicly available reports on the current probe of Danske Bank AS to 
demonstrate how these traditional means facilitate money laundering in a scandal in which other major 
international banks, including Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase may be 
implicated.43 
A. Placement of Funds or Assets into Vehicles That Enable Layering 
The first task of money launderers, regardless of their reasons for seeking to obscure the origin 
of funds or assets, is to find a location or an asset in which to “place” them, initially -- preferably into a 
form of account or property that can be moved along quickly, repeatedly, and securely into the first 
“layering” transaction, described in the next section. Traditional choices for initial placements have 
included banks, broker-dealers in securities, insurance brokers, and a host of sellers of tangible property 
including real estate, motor vehicles, boats, jewelry, and art.  
In the United States we apply the requirements mentioned in the first paragraph of this Part to 
most of the providers mentioned here, but the specific “customer identification” requirements of 
Section 326 of the USA Patriot Act44 depend in some respects on the provider or seller chosen.  
                                                          
41 Statement of Michael J. Murphy, Senior Deputy Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Business Community’s 
Compliance with Federal Money Laundering Statutes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House 
Comm. On Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1990).  
42 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, National Money Laundering Risk Assessment, at 2 n.1 (2015),  
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/National%20Money%20Laundering%20Risk%20Assessment%20%E2%80%93%2006-12-
2015.pdf [hereinafter “NMLRA 2015”].  Note: the 2015 report does not address risks presented by virtual 
currencies or blockchain-based activity.  See id. at 22-85 (discussion of specific financial and commercial activity 
used in money laundering). The Department also issues a U.S. Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment periodically.  
43 See Milne and Winter, supra note 40; Hope, Kowsmann, and Hinshar, supra note 40. Both articles reveal how lax internal anti-money-laundering controls and management attitudes contributed to the duration of the behavior being investigated. Both articles reveal how lax internal anti-money-laundering controls and management attitudes contributed to the duration of the behavior being investigated.  For additional discussion, see text accompanying note 40, supra, and notes 53-55, infra.  
44 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism, tit. III (the International Money Laundering abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001), Pub. L. 
Pub. L. 107-56, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (October 26, 2001) (codified in various titles of the United States Code).  
 11 
Nearly adult in the United States will have had to prove their identity when they seek to open a 
new account since the USA Patriot Act45 became effective.  This is true regardless of whether the 
“financial institution” at which they were seeking to open the account or obtain a loan or other financial 
service for the first time was an account at a bank, a nonbank financial services provider, a broker-
dealer, or an insurance company.   
If the person opening the account or conducting a transaction presents $10,000 or more in cash, 
then US law requires that the recipient financial institution report that transaction to the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) if the recipient is a bank or credit union, or a broker-dealer, or 
a dealer in precious metals, gemstones, or jewelry.46 If the amount is less than $10,000, a report might 
be required if (a) one or more transactions related to each other occurs in a brief period or in a “related 
transaction,”47 (b) the customer made repeated transactions of smaller amounts that the recipient 
believes are intended to avoid the $10,000 or more threshold and suggest that “structuring” to avoid 
being reported,48 or (c) the buyer uses certain monetary instruments with face amounts of $3,000 or 
more.49 Such transactions also could be deemed “suspicious,” giving rise to obligations to file 
“Suspicious Activity Reports.”50 “Persons engaged in trades or business” in the United States also must 
report transactions with customers in a $10,000 or more-threshold basis with reports going to the 
Internal Revenue Service.51 
Similar requirements do not exist in all countries.  The U.S. Department of Treasury and FinCEN, 
and other intergovernmental organizations, publish reports on countries whose anti-money-laundering 
measures are perceived to be weaker than our requirements.52 Person seeking to obscure the origin of 
funds or assets or the beneficial ownership of those funds or assets traditionally may see benefit in 
making initial “placements” in banks or other intermediaries occur in a country with weaker customer-
identification/account-opening, record-keeping, or transaction-reporting requirements.  
Some entities involved in “placement” or “layering” outside of the United States are still subject 
to U.S laws because they are regulated by U.S. regulators.  This was true in the investigation that led to 
the settlement with Rabobank National Association, a California-based subsidiary of Cooperative 
Rabobank, U.A. in the Netherlands, for engaging in money laundering.53 This is true in the pending 
investigation of Danske Bank, as well as of Deutsche Bank and Citigroup offices abroad are regulated by 
                                                          
45 31 C.F.R. Part 1010 (2018). 
46 Id. 
47 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2018). 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 26 U.S.C. § 6050l (cash transaction reporting by persons engaged in a trade or business).  For compliance 
information relating to this statute, see Internal Revenue Service, Form 8300, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f8300.pdf (last updated Dec. 2018).  
52 See, e.g., NMLRA 2015, supra note 16. 
53 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Press Release, Rabobank NA Pleads Guilty, Agrees to Pay Over $360 Million (February 7, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov (guilty plea included conspiracy to defraud the United States, obstruction of 
examination of a financial institution, and concealing deficiencies in its AML program, which included taking 
“hundreds of millions of dollars in untraceable cash” into its branches in California, and later transferring them via 
wire transfers, checks, and cash without proper identification).    
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U.S. regulators.54 Funds apparently given over to the Estonian branch of Danske Bank by non-Estonian 
customers of the branch and later moved into or from that branch in transactions involving dollar-
denominated wire transfers handled by Deutsche Bank or in transactions from Citigroup’s Moscow 
office to the Estonia branch of Danske Bank.55 
For cryptocurrencies, the source of “customer identification” requirements depends on whether 
there is a central manager of the currency or a service provider and whether that person qualifies as a 
“money service business” subject to FinCEN’s registration requirements.56 New York State’s Department 
of Financial Services requires the holders of BitLicenses to record and maintain records of their 
customers.57  The Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act (“URVCBA”), not yet enacted in 
any state, requires that licensees and registrants keep records of their customers and their customers’ 
transactions.58  
B. “Layering” assets through multiple transfers or forms of property, banks, or banking 
systems 
“Layering” is the stage during which funds or assets move away from their original placements 
toward the eventual, integration as clean money, bank credits, or other clean assets that money 
launderers’ clients seek.  
More than 20 years ago, the United States Department of the Treasury considered wire 
transfers to be “the arteries of the international financial system,” and proclaimed that “use of wire 
transfers is a necessity for many large scale [sic] money laundering schemes. Wire transfers are used 
both to move funds out of (or into) the United States and to confuse the money trail.”59 Multiple wire 
transfers were used to repatriate to the United States funds originally derived from illicit drug sales in 
the United States but shipped or carried abroad and “placed” in banks there.60 The value that these wire 
transfers represented would move through banks with offices in New York, for example, and then 
possibly move on inside the United States or wherever else the owner wished to have the funds 
available with the appearance of legitimacy in their ownership.  
                                                          
54 Hope, Kowsmann, and Hinshaw, supra note 40.  
55 Id.  
56 31 C.F.R. § 1010. 
57 23 NYCRR § 200.12 (2015) (specifying “books and records” to be created and maintained by BitLicense holders).  
58 Uniform Law Comm’n, Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act, § 302 (2017), 
www.uniformlaws.org (“registrants” have alerted specific state regulators that they are engaging in “virtual-
currency business activity” in their state but have volumes of business of less than $35,000 annually; as they reach 
the dollar threshold, registrants must apply for licenses and may continue to do business in that state unless their 
application is denied). As noted in the Author’s Note, I served as Reporter for this project. 
59 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Press Release, The Treasury Department released two final rules Thursday that will for 
the first time require uniform recordkeeping for wire transfers under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), Dec. 22, 1994, 
https://www.fincen.gov/news-releases/treasury-department-released-two-final-rules-thursday-will-first-time-
require.  
60  U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Recordkeeping for Funds Transfers by Banks 
and Transmittals of Funds by Other Financial Institutions, 54 Fed. Reg. 45,769 (Oct. 31, 1989) (proposed rule for 
international wire transfers or transmittals).  
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The Treasury Department originally proposed in 1990 to extend its Bank Secrecy Act record-
keeping to domestic wire transfers and funds transmittals.61 This proposal specifically included among 
the non-bank transmitters to be covered currency exchanges, telegraph companies, and registered 
securities broker-dealers.62 The department eventually promulgated in 1994 an enhanced 
recordkeeping requirement for bank and nonbank financial institutions handling funds transfers and 
funds transmittals in amounts of $3,000 or more.63  
A second proposed rule would require the “financial institution” to capture information about 
the originator or sender64 of the first wire transfer in a sequence and keep that information “traveling 
along” through as many layers of wire transfers as happened until the funds arrived in the beneficiary’s 
bank.65 This proposal had to overcome opposition based in the fact that the formats used for wire 
transfers at that time had limited “fields” for information, and the habit was only to pass along the 
information needed by the originating bank to reach the next bank in the sequence until the last 
“payment order”66 in the wire transfer that ended with the beneficiary’s bank, and ultimately to reach 
the beneficiary. This effort culminated with what is known as “the travel rule” that required that the 
originator’s information flow through the payment orders to the end of the funds transfer or funds 
transmittal.67  
Similar regulations require maintenance of records in domestic funds transfers,68 and for banks 
and nonbanks to maintain records of international funds transfers and transmittals of funds.69  FinCEN’s 
“Travel Rule,” which applies only to funds transfers of $3,000 or more and to the extent that a bank or 
“money transmitter” is involved does not apply to all cryptocurrency transactions, Still, because of a 
September 2010 amendment, the Travel Rule reaches many cross-border electronic transmittals of 
funds “denominated in any currency,”70 and can serve as a powerful tool for law enforcement agencies 
                                                          
61 U.S. Dept’ of Treasury, Proposed Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Recordkeeping for 
Funds Transfers by Banks and Transmittals of Funds by Other Financial Institutions, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (Oct. 15, 
1990).  
62 Id. at 41,704 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(f), the precursor to current 31 C.F.R. § 1010.330).  
63  12 C.F.R. Part 219 (2018) (Threshold for the Requirement to Collect, Retain, and Transmit Information on Funds 
Transfers and Transmittals of Funds) (Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System version of this regulation).  
For more information see, Fin. Crimes Enf. Net., Threshold for the Requirement to Collect, retain, and Transmit 
Information on Funds Transfers and Transmittals of Funds, 60 Fed. Reg. 220-21 (Jan. 3, 1995). 
64  12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(3) (defining “funds transfer,” “originator,” “beneficiary,” and “payment order” for 
provisions related to banks, and “transmittal of funds” to include a funds transfer and the non-bank transmittal). 
For more information, see 31 C.F.R. §103.11(jj).  
65 Fin. Crimes Enf. Network, 60 Fed. Reg. 23401 (Jan. 3, 1995) (this rule was codified originally at 31 C.F.R. § 
103.33(g)).  FinCEN and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System jointly promulgated a separate rule 
known colloquially as the “Funds Transfer Rule,” codified originally at 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(e) recordkeeping 
requirements for banks), 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(f) (recordkeeping for nonbank financial institutions).  
66 See Sarah Jane Hughes, Policing Money Laundering Through Fund Transfers: A Critique of Regulation Under the 
Bank Secrecy Act, 67 IND. L. J. 283 (1992) (describing how “payment orders” are comprised and how the combine to 
constitute a “funds transfer” on an end-to-end basis). 
67 31 C.F.R. 31 C.F.R. § 1010 (2018) (definitions) (originally codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(g)). 
68 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(B)(2) (2018) (bank and nonbank financial institutions required to maintain records on 
transmittals of funds); 31 C.F.R. § 1010 (originally codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(jj)). 
69 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(3) (2018). 
70 U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Cross-Border Electronic Transmittals of Funds, 75 
Fed. Reg. 60377, 60396 (September 2010), (including definitions originally codified at 103.14).   
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and regulators to observe the movements of funds through regulated “Four R’s” entities.  These tools 
were useful in identifying funds flows, for example, from the Russian Federation and Estonia, that a 
whistleblower used to alert the Securities and Exchange Commission.71 
C. Emergence of Funds or Assets in Forms That Look Legitimate or that Arrive 
In the final phase of money laundering -- integration, funds finally emerge as funds or real or 
tangible assets that look legitimate to those around them.  This is the goal of the cadres of bank and 
non-bank and other professionals that aid in the process.  
Integration or emergence is the step that may leave the federal government’s focus on 
regulated entities as a viable tool in a blockchain-based future.  This will be the case as long as money 
launderers and their clients will need to rely on regulated entities as they have in the past to use some 
proceeds in the mainstream economy. 
IV. Challenges and Opportunities that Cryptocurrencies or Other Crypto-Assets Present to 
Current AML Efforts and Remedies Currently Available to U.S. Law Enforcement Irrelevant 
Professors Vartanian and Ledig asked the interesting question -- whether permission-less 
blockchains will render AML detection and enforcement laws and protocols inadequate. My answer to 
this question is “no” – or at least “not yet.”  Although most of the Bank Secrecy Act and FinCEN’s 
regulations enforcing the former’s many provisions have been focused on providers against whom the 
“Four R’s” were designed to work, at least for the immediate future those regulated providers will 
continue to be important to detection of money laundering through cryptocurrencies and other crypto 
assets.  That information that FinCEN already requires these providers to have and to report can be 
augmented by reconstructions from public blockchains. Part of the reason for my answer is that many 
cryptocurrency transactions are not as anonymous as previously thought.72   
To evaluate why existing regulatory tools will remain useful, we should review what has 
happened since 2013 when, as described above, FinCEN published its first guidance on which 
cryptocurrency functions constituted “money services” and, accordingly, whose providers should 
register with FinCEN as “money services businesses.“  Following that review, we need to look at specific 
requirements in force that serve AML deterrence, detection and enforcement purposes – assuming law 
enforcement agencies have suitable resources going forward. This Part also describes other tools 
available to detect money laundering through permission-less blockchains.  
A. FinCEN’s Baseline Guidance on Administrators of and Exchanges dealing in 
“Convertible” Virtual Currencies as Subject to its “Money Services Businesses” Regulations 
FinCEN’s March 2013 guidance on virtual currency73 issued by a central management and third-
party providers that offer comparable intermediary services to owners of cryptocurrencies expanded 
                                                          
71 Hope, Kowsmann, and Hinshaw, supra note 40.  
72 See Emerging Tehcnology from the arXiv, Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, MIT 
TECH. REV. 1 (August 23, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608716/bitcoin-transactions-arent-as-
anonymous-as-everyone-hoped/.  
73 Fin. Crimes Enf. Net., U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, 
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, FIN-2013-G001, at 1 (March 18, 2013),  www.fincen.gov [hereinafter 
“FinCEN March 2013 Guidance”].  
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FinCEN’s 2011 “prepaid access” provider regulations74 to reach many products and providers in the 
cryptocurrency industry. The perimeter captured many provider-intermediaries of related products and 
services and required that they register with FinCEN as “money services businesses,”75 even if no state 
law required them to be licensed as “money transmitters.” Additionally, as noted above, FinCEN’s 
customer-identification-program and “Travel Rule” requirements attached to these provider-
intermediaries. Thus, for providers of convertible virtual currencies who do business in the United 
States, FinCEN’s 2013 Guidance expanded the ability of regulators to oversee issuers, administrators, 
distributors, acceptors, transmitters and exchangers.76  
“Prepaid access” transactions, in turn, are subject to FinCEN’s 2011 rules on anti-money-
laundering compliance requirements.77 The 2011 final rule imposed on persons offering “prepaid 
access” five types of duties – registration with FinCEN,78 record-creation and keeping and reporting 
requirements,79 anti-money-laundering compliance program creation and implementation,80 currency-
transaction reporting,81 and suspicious-activity reporting.82 
Failure to comply with the requirements FinCEN has imposed on prepaid access transactions 
include the array of AML criminal sanctions.83 Failure to register as a “money services business” (“MSB”) 
subjects the entity to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1960, which penalizes MSBs) that (1) fail to register 
themselves with FinCEN, (2) engage in unlicensed activity that state law prohibits to those not holding 
the appropriate license(s), or (3) knowingly receive the proceeds of illicit activity.84  It is important to 
note that the first and second circumstances defined in Section 1960 are strict-liability, non-scienter 
criminal offenses for which courts impose substantial monetary penalties and prison sentences.  Only 
the third is a scienter-based crime.  Accordingly, participation or being and not intent is not required to 
establish liability. 
The regulatory perimeter that FinCEN created in 2013 did not reach permission-less, public 
blockchains such as Bitcoin because it has no central management.85  As a result, permission-less, 
blockchain-based transactions offer a competing avenue for moving value, including currency positions, 
                                                          
74 Fin. Crimes Enf. Network, Bank Secrecy Act Regulations -Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid 
Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45403 (July 29, 2011) (renaming “stored value” as “prepaid access” and defining the term, 
imposing suspicious activity reporting , customer information and transaction information recordkeeping 
requirements on providers as well as sellers of prepaid access, requiring registration with FinCEN of providers, and 
exempting categories of prepaid access products and services “posing lower risks of money laundering  and 
terrorist financing” from some requirements). The rule went into effect on September 27, 2011 with full 
compliance with 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 required by January 29, 2012. Id. at 45403.  
75 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2018). 
76 FinCEN 2013 Guidance, supra note 73, at 1. 
77 2011 Prepaid Access Regulations, supra note 60.  
78 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2018).  
79 31 C.F.R. § 1022.420 (2018).  
80 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210 (2018).  
81 31 C.F.R. § 1022.420 (2018).  
82 See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320 (2018) (requirements for banks, securities broker-dealers, and others). 
83 31 C.F.R. § 1022.420 (2018).  
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
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outside of the regulatory perimeter previously established by FinCEN.  These transactions also offer 
speedy and inexpensive, cross-border transactions86 for trade and remittance purposes.  
FinCEN has not yet extended its 2013 “prepaid access” guidance to transactions on permission-
less blockchains where no intermediary is involved. As a result, there are no requirements enforced by 
the United States Treasury Department for permission-less blockchains per se or the individuals who 
participate in their consensus mechanisms to verify transfers in the United States to be registered as 
“money services businesses,” to keep records, to implement anti-money-laundering compliance 
programs, or to report “suspicious transactions” to the authorities. 
Because of FinCEN’s designation of “money services businesses” to include persons administering or 
exchanging virtual currencies that can be converted to fiat currencies,87 and the requirement of 
registration with FinCEN mentioned above, the failure of persons administering or offering exchange 
services operating inside the United States to register triggers criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1960.  
Because permission-less blockchains often have no administrators within the scope of FIN-2013-G001, 
there may be no “person” with sufficient power over the blockchain governments can require to submit 
themselves to the Four R’s style requirements.  This is one of the few features of public, permission-less 
blockchain technologies that Congress or Treasury might seek to address.  
Unlike “wire transfers” and some other non-bank electronic transfers after Treasury’s “Travel 
Rule” became effective, blockchain-based transactions do not show information identifying the counter-
parties (senders or recipients).88 Transactions may take place on a peer-to-peer (“P2P”) basis with no 
traditional intermediary involved89 or from one location to a recipient’s “personal wallet or another type 
of recipient unable to accept identifying information.”90 In these environments, transactions may be 
used to obscure the identities to transactions through anonymity or pseudonymity, but reconstruction is 
possible, as noted above.  To the extent a person subject to FinCEN’s 2013 Guidance is involved, that 
person’s separate customer-identification and record-keeping compliance obligations should be 
available to identify transaction participants in many current cryptocurrency offerings. 
Blockchain-based transactions have been used for illicit transactions.  Examples include the 
notorious dark-web bazaar for narcotics and weapons known as “Silk Road,” whose founder, Ross 
William Ulbricht, was identified, arrested and convicted of money laundering, using the pseudonymity of 
bitcoins. 91  In 2018, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) identified two Iranian 
                                                          
86 See Jeffrey Gogo, Crypto-Based Transfers Can Cut Remittance Costs in Africa by 90%, BITCOIN.COM (April 23, 2019), 
https://news.bitcoin.com/crypto-based-transfers-can-cut-remittance-costs-in-africa-by-90/ (describing relative 
fees in percentages of dollars sent to Africa through banks and crypto systems); see also, Bitcoin is Now Moving 
11% of Venmo’s Yearly Total in One Day, BITCOINIST.COM (April 11, 2019) (describing advantages in Bitcoin’s 
“scaling solutions” as causes of “headaches” for competitors). 
87 FinCEN 2013 Guidance, supra note 73, at 1-3 (“users” are exempt from “money services business” registration 
requirements under this guidance). 
88 See “’Onerous’ FATF recommendations Harmful for Crypto Transparency: Chainanalysis,” COINDESK.COM (April 12, 
2019), https://www.coindesk.com/chainanalysis-onerous-fatf-recommendations-harmful-for-crypto-transparency 
(commenting that the addresses used do not contain identification information and lack the capacity to carry it).  
89 Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 1. 
90 Id.  
91 Sam Thielman, Silk Road operator Ross Ulbricht sentenced to life in prison, TheGuardian.com (May 29, 2015, 
21.02 BST) (and imposition of a double-life sentence). 
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intermediaries by name who were laundering proceeds from the Sam-Sam ransomware attacks and 
placed them and their blockchain addresses on OFAC’s “Specially Designated Nationals” list.92  
Cryptocurrency proponents note the value of public blockchains to help trace and reconstruct 
the value transfers and to identify the individuals involved.93 The author of the Bitcoin white paper, 
Satoshi Nakamoto, hailed the ability of blockchains to enable transactions to be associated with others – 
by working back through the chain to the shortest entry on the chain and or identifying the transfers of 
assets in forward or reverse sequence as the length of the addresses lengthens or shortens, 
respectively.94  
B. The United States Has Other Tools to Deter and Help Detect Money Laundering Through 
Permission-less Blockchain-Based Transactions 
The United States imposes a variety of obligations on depository institutions and a broad array of 
non-depository financial services providers designated as “financial institutions” collectively by the Bank 
Secrecy Act, including amendments since 1970, and by the USA Patriot Act of 2001.95 The obligations 
include (1) establishment, monitoring, personnel training and re-retaining and revision of risk-based 
anti-money-laundering compliance programs required by Section 352 of the USA Patriot Act,96 (2) 
transaction-record-keeping-and-retention requirements,97 (3) threshold-based transaction reporting,98 
including “suspicious-activity” reports,99 (4) requirements for customer-identification or beneficial 
ownership information to be obtained at account opening,100 (5) rules prohibiting having “shell 
companies” as customers of banks,101 (6) special rules for certain correspondent-banking 
                                                          
92 U.S. Dep’t. of Treasury, “Treasury Designates Iran-Based Financial Facilitators of Malicious Cyber Activity and for 
the First Time Identifies Associated Digital Currency Addresses,” Nov. 28, 2018, 
https://home.treasury/gov/news/press-releases/sm556 (describing both actions taken against two Iranians, 
naming the Iranians, listing the individuals as “specially designated nationals,” and warning individuals dealing with 
two Bitcoin addresses associated with these two “facilitators” that they might be subject to secondary sanctions 
for violations of OFAC regulations and Executive Orders) [hereinafter “Treasury Action Identifying Bitcoin 
Addresses”]. For more discussion of Treasury’s action, see Alastair Marsh, U.S. Exposes Bitcoin Addresses of 
Sanctioned Iranians, BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov. 28, 2018, 1:10 PM EST),  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-28/u-s-exposes-bitcoin-users-addresses-in-iran-cyber-
sanctions. 
93 Jonathan Levin and Jesse Spiro, Chainanalaysis Letter to Secretariat, Financial Action Task Force, April 8, 2019, 
http://go.chainalysis.com/rs/503-FAP-
074/images/Chainalysis_Input_7b_Public_Statement.pdf?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWW1abU1HVTFOVFpsT0RrdyIsInQiOiIy
RUlOcHE1c3NOTEhWRzArVW9uVWw4OGdTUStYTXNDNVNRazRkTHFhMFBNMFpjbmNyRW1ha25uclpIVms0RUNKd
lwvTlZ0bWxFOGVoWDN1OHhPZm9mdTVPQjJmb2JHR09BRzFaR1UxNHU2dFhGdEQ4bUltZFh1UnJlMEJFYXErck0ifQ
%3D%3D (offering comments on Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, particularly paragraph 7(b) from a 
company that provides “commercial blockchain intelligence software” to “map blockchain transactions to real 
world entities”) [hereinafter “Levin and Spiro”].  
94 See Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 2-3 (timestamp server and proof-of-work).  
95 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2018). 
96 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2018) (broker-dealers, banks, and others required to institute risk-based anti-money-
laundering programs).  
97 31 C.F.R. § 1022 (2018). 
98  31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2018). 
99 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(4) (2018) (requirements extend to broker-dealers as well). 
100 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l) (2018) (provision designated “Verification and Identification of Customers”). 
101 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2018). 
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relationships,102 and (7) special rules for cross-border transmittals of funds.103 These requirements apply 
to “money service businesses” and broker-dealers as well as banks.104 Whistleblower complaints 
augment these record-and-reporting regimes.105  The Supreme Court held that the Bank Secrecy Act was 
constitutional in a landmark decision in California Bankers Association v. Shultz,106 with specific 
reasoning that Congress legally could delegate rulemaking authority to the Secretary of the Treasury for 
purposes encompassed by the original version of the Bank Secrecy Act. 
In addition, under the wide-ranging statutes, Executive Orders, and regulations enforced by the 
Office of Asset Controls (“OFAC”) in the Department of the Treasury, “U.S. persons” are prohibited from 
doing business with entities and individuals on the OFAC’s published “Specially Designated Nationals” 
(“SDN”) list.107  The prohibition applies unless an exemption exists or the U.S. person obtains a license 
specifically permitting the business or relationship to occur.  
Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act108 is among the most powerful tool for deterrence of money 
laundering.  The Director of the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”) also has authority through a process including notice-and-comment rulemaking to designate 
jurisdictions of major money laundering concern109 – with the result that specific entities will be banned 
from access to the U.S. financial system.110 These powers and practices have snared global banks, some 
in more than one investigation.111  
Remedies that may be imposed for violations include asset freezes and forfeitures, criminal 
penalties on individuals and organizations, designations of individuals, organizations, government 
                                                          
102 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i)(2) (2018). 
103 31 U.S.C. § 5318(n) (2018). 
104 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2018). 
105 See Bradley Hope, Patricia Kowsmann, and Drew Hinshaw, supra n. 40. Other reports put the amount that moved through the Estonian branch as high as $234 billion. Frances Coppola, The Banks That Helped Danske 
Bank Estonia Launder Russian Money, FORBES.COM (Sept. 30, 2018, 5:42 pm) (also reporting that “much of the money was paid in U.S. dollars, … and [the bank] needed help from other banks. Banks that had access to Fedwire).  
106 416 U.S. 21 (1974) For a fascinating call for blockchain businesses to challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Bank Secrecy Act from a blockchain enthusiast, see Caitlin Long, Supreme Court and Digital Privacy: Should 
Blockchain Companies Challenge the Bank Secrecy Act, FORBES.COM (June 28, 2018 1:25 PM),  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/2018/06/28/supreme-court-and-digital-privacy-should-blockchain-
companies-challenge-the-bank-secrecy-act/#4ee4bf0562fc Ms. Long’s challenge is based on recent Fourth 
Amendment decisions by the Court.  If Ms. Long proved to challenge the constitutionality of the BSA facially or as 
applied and prevailed, some of the conclusions in this essay could need revisiting. 
107 U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Controls, Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List 
(SDN), (updated to April 26, 2019), www.treasury.gov/pages (list of individuals and companies owned or controlled 
by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries, or who are narcotics “kingpins”). 
108 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (Special Measures for Jurisdictions, financial institutions, international transactions, or types 
of accounts of primary money laundering concern), Pub.L. 107-56, title III, § 311(a), Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 298.  
109 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2018), 
110 E.g., U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enf. Network, Imposition of Special Measures Against FBME Bank Ltd., 
Formerly Known as the Federal Bank of the Middle East Ltd., as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering 
Concern, 80 Fed. Reg. 45057 (July 29, 2015) (notice of finding and imposition of special measures using FinCEN’s 
authority under 31 C.F.R. Part 1010 against a bank with offices in Tanzania and Cyprus with alleged ties to Russia).  
111 E.g., Standard Chartered Bank, HSBC, and others. 
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agencies, and property (particularly vessels) as prohibited for “U.S. persons” to engage with, and, using 
Section 311, loss of access to U.S. financial systems.112 
Since Congress passed the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992,113 anti-money-
laundering compliance requirements have increased significantly.  Some of these new tools apply to 
banks and non-bank financial institutions, including some nonbank actors such as “money services 
businesses.”114 Others require record-keeping and threshold-based transaction reporting by persons 
engaged in trades or business,115 such as sellers of motor vehicles and luxury goods. FinCEN has issued 
guidance on the application to cryptocurrency products and industry participants since March 2013116 
and working with other federal agencies has brought most of the enforcement actions since 2013 
described in Subpart D of this Part and in the enforcement actions appendix to this essay.   
These AML tools may seem old-fashioned in their reliance on information provided by financial 
intermediaries to ferret out money launderers and new methods. However, the Panama Papers117 and 
Paradise Papers118 investigations demonstrate that they remain powerful tools, for example, enabling 
New York State’s Department of Financial Services to demand from banks it supervises information on 
shell companies, customers, and transactions.119   
C. Internal Revenue Service Guidance 
                                                          
112 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2018). 
113 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(2) (2018). 
114 See 31 C.F.R Parts 1010 (definitions of seller of prepaid access and “money services businesses”) and 1022 (rules 
for “Money Services Businesses”) (2018) [hereinafter “2011 Prepaid Access Regulations”]. For additional 
information on this 2011 final rule, see U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Fin/ Crimes Enf. Net., Bank Secrecy Act Regulations – 
Definitions and Other Regulations relating to Prepaid Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45403 (July 29, 2011). 
115 26 U.S.C. § 6050l (2018) (requiring records of the receipt of cash or currency of $10,000 or more in one or more 
“related transactions” in a calendar year, annual notices to customers whose use of cash exceeds the threshold, 
and annual reports to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service of personally identifiable information pertaining to those 
customers and of transaction details).  Note that this requirement is codified in the revenue title, not the Bank 
Secrecy Act title of the U.S. Code.  There is some overlap between the title 26 USC provisions and the title 31 USC 
provisions.  For example, jewelers have record-keeping responsibilities to enable them to make title 26 reports and 
notices, and also to have title 31 anti-money-laundering compliance and customer-identification programs in place 
and up-to-date.  
116 FinCEN March 2013 Guidance, supra, note 73, passim]. 
117 See Luke Harding, What are the Panama Papers? A guide to history’s biggest data leak, THEGUARDIAN.COM 
(April 5, 2016 10:42 BST), www.theguardian.com (reporting on a data breach affecting 11.5 million files from the 
offices of the world’s biggest offshore law firm, Mossack Fonseca, that highlighted the range of activities, assets, 
and identities of its clients, including those of government leaders in Russia, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Iceland, among 
others, leaked to investigative reporters).  
118 Nick Hopkins and Helena Bengtsson, What are the Paradise Papers and what do they tell us, 
THEGUARDIAN.COM (November 5, 2017 18:00 GMT), www.theguardian.com (describing the leak of 13.4 million 
files, 6.8 million of which relate to Appleby, a law firm in Bermuda now called Estera, from 1993 to 2014 that 
detailed money flows into offshore centers on behalf of an exclusive clientele from the United States, United 
Kingdom, Hong Kong and China, also leaked to investigative journalists).  
119 https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/20160420-ny-banks-regulator/.  
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In addition to FinCEN’s regulations and guidance documents, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
declared in 2014 that virtual currencies were “property” not “currency.”120 This decision exposed virtual 
currency transactions to “capital gains” taxation under U.S. tax laws. Thus, persons who own virtual 
currencies and securities, for example, would have to report and pay tax on any gains they received on 
the later sale or use of the cryptocurrencies in transactions. IRS’ position means that users of virtual 
currencies will need to track their bases in virtual currencies and the timing of transactions and 
ownership transfers. Records needed to mitigate capital gains liabilities should assist the IRS and law 
enforcement to the extent allowed by law.  
D. U.S. Enforcement Actions before and after FinCEN’s March 2013 Guidance 
The final source of regulatory action is represented by enforcement actions.  A handful of these 
actions illustrate the current capacity of U.S.-based law enforcement agencies and financial regulators to 
deal with cryptocurrency industry participants who are not licensed, not registered with FinCEN, or are 
name brands that had inadequate AML compliance programs. The online presence of many of the 
defendants in U.S. enforcement actions made their detection more likely, which is a benefit of public, 
permission-less blockchains.  Currently, many blockchain-based transactions are, as Satoshi Nakamoto 
described them, open to view and traceable on the blockchain even if the parties – or the embedded 
“smart contracts” executing pre-arranged exchanges -- are anonymous or pseudonymous. The prospects 
that transactions may be executed via “smart contracts” following the occurrence of a predetermined, 
coded event or that more private cryptocurrencies, however, will make it more difficult to regulate 
them for many purposes.  
To illustrate the array of law enforcement actions brought by the United States, Appendix 1 to 
this essay contains examples that demonstrate that law enforcement agencies have been able to detect 
the use of blockchain-based technologies by entities with weak AML compliance programs or entities 
accused to have engaged directly in money laundering.  The examples in Appendix 1 show a range: they 
are (1) not all criminal actions, (2) not all federal actions, (3) not presented in chronological order, and 
(4) not presented in terms of the dollar amounts involved.  The examples used in Appendix 1 are here 
primarily to help readers assess the types of activity that attracted law enforcement agencies’ attention 
and the enforcement approaches being used.  There is no explanation of how law enforcement agencies 
identified the targets or defendants: for such inside information, one needs a security clearance that I 
do not possess. 
V. Cryptocurrency and Permission-less Blockchains Are Not the Major Issue in Tracing 
Placement and Laying of Illicit Proceeds – Locating the Entity to Regulate Is 
As law enforcement agencies and financial regulators have succeeded in limiting access by 
money launderers to banks and other types of established financial services providers, the concern has 
been that professional money launderers will shift their efforts to other methods. These professionals 
may turn or already are turning to cryptocurrency and permission-less blockchain transactions for these 
                                                          
120 Int. Rev. Serv., Notice 2014-21, Frequently Asked Questions (March 25, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop.  
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purposes.121  This part looks at the steps that money-laundering professionals take to launder money, 
the additional opportunities that permission-less blockchains offer these professionals and their clients 
and some barriers to ultimate movement away from all-blockchain, no-intermediary-involved commerce 
in goods or services, and tools that regulators and law enforcement agencies employ. Among the tools 
that U.S. regulators and law enforcement agencies have available is USA Patriot Act Section 311,122 
available to deal with jurisdictions and actors that present special money-laundering concerns, which 
this Part also discusses. 
A. Placement of Value  
In the United States, we regulate those providers that can receive “deposits” of money as banks 
or credit unions, and those that can receive funds for prompt transmittal to others as “money 
transmitters” or “money services businesses.” States regulate the non-depository providers operating as 
“money transmitters” or “money services businesses.”123 Bank regulators in two states recently opined 
that receiving cryptocurrencies as opposed to “fiat currency”124 or “sovereign currency”125 is not “money 
transmission” because the value being received is not “money.”126 The guidance issued by Texas’ 
Banking Department, however, takes the position that “stable coins” such as Tether – cryptocurrencies  
issued by centralized entities with values pegged to and at least theoretically supported by designated 
fiat currencies127 – as being within the definition of “money”128 and, thus, confirmed that they are 
subject to licensure and prudential regulation in Texas.129  
 Unlike bank deposits, cash, and monetary instruments whose use and flows through the hands 
of entities subject to the “Four 4’s,” once proceeds come in cryptocurrencies or are placed into 
cryptocurrencies, the ownership is harder to trace than the movements along permission-less 
blockchains. However, when the owner or controller of the cryptocurrency or other blockchain-based 
asset wants to convert it to fiat currency or use it to acquire other assets whose acquisition requires 
assistance from a “Four 4’s” regulated entity, the reason is that the persons using permission-less 
blockchains may not be subject to know-your-customer compliance, record-keeping, or threshold-based 
transaction reporting, including suspicious-activity reporting. Efforts to extend these AML and CTF 
                                                          
121 For additional information about prior cryptocurrencies and issues related to some of the more notorious, see 
Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 
RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2393537.  
122 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2018). 
123 E.g., Texas Finance Code Chapter 151 (2018).  
124 Texas Dept. of Banking, Supervisory Memorandum 1037, at 3 (January 2, 2019, revised April 1, 2019), 
https://www.dob.texas.gov (providing an excellent explanation of its reasoning why cryptocurrencies other than 
stable coins are not “money”) [hereinafter “Texas Supervisory Memorandum”]; Pennsylvania Dept. of Banking and 
Securities, “Money Trasnmitter Act Guidance for Virtual Currency Businesses,” at 1 (January 25, 2019), 
https://www.dobs.pa.gove/Pages (differentiating “money transmitters” subject to licensure from most virtual 
currency exchange platforms, kiosks, ATM, or vending machines) [hereinafter “Pennsylvania Revised Supervisory 
Guidance for Virtual Currency Businesses”]. 
125 Texas Supervisory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 2 (explaining that sovereign-backed stable coins include 
rights allowing the coin holder to redeem the stable coin for for sovereign currency from the issuer). 
126 E.g., Pennsylvania Revised Supervisory Guidance for Virtual Currency Businesses, supra note 122, at 1. 
127 Texas Supervisory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 2 (explaining that “one Tether coin is the equivalent value 
of one USD at all times”). 
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
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requirements to cryptocurrencies have begun – in the U.S., with FinCEN’s guidance since 2013, as 
described in Part IV, Section A of this essay, in New York State’s BitLicense regulations,130 and under the 
EC’s AMLD5.131 
B. Layering through Cryptocurrencies or Decentralized Ledgers  
 The speed at which transfers of value held in cryptocurrencies may occur and the degree of 
anonymity or pseudonymity users expect make permission-less blockchain transactions attractive 
means of “layering” illicit proceeds.  Cryptocurrency transactions provide only pseudonymity.132 This 
pseudonymity “does not provide a user of blockchain technology with an absolute assurance that her 
identity will not be discovered” by “a determined party with access to certain information….”133 
We might perceive that it is easier to layer illicit proceeds through jurisdictions with stricter 
“bank secrecy” laws134 than the U.S. or jurisdictions subject to the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) have.135 A key feature of the GDPR, which went into effect in May 2018,136 is the 
grant to individuals to have their personal data erased.137 In contrast, a key feature of blockchain 
technologies is that there are no correction or deletion options.138  Thus, the advantages of using certain 
weak-AML jurisdictions and blockchain technologies to layer illicit proceeds appear greater than they 
are likely to be in all jurisdictions. 
C. Emergence of Layered Assets into Legitimate-Appearing Assets 
The goal of placement and layering of illicit proceeds is to see them emerge as “clean assets.” Some 
of the methods that these professionals use were revealed when The Guardian and The New York 
Times, among other major newspapers, disclosed caches of transactions from the files of law firms in 
Panama and Bermuda, respectively known as “the Panama Papers”139 and “the Paradise Papers.”140 
                                                          
130 23 NYCRR Part 200, at § 200.15 (2015). 
131 AMLD5, supra note 2. 
132 See Christopher Escobedo Hart, European Union: Blockchain and Data Privacy, Foley Hoag Security, Privacy and 
the Law Blog, at 1, February 20, 2019, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=782988&email_access=on 
[hereinafter “Hart”]. 
133 Id. 
134 See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Following the Money: Lessons from the “Panama Papers,” Part 1: Tip of the 
Iceberg, 121 PENN. ST. L. REV. 807 (2017), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2783503.  
135 Eur. Comm’n, (EU) General Data Protection Regulation,  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/justice-
and-fundamental-rights/data-protection/2018-reform-eu-data-protection-rules_en [hereinafter “GDPR Text”].  For 
more analysis, see http://eugdpr.org.  
136 Id., at para. 53. 
137 Id. at Art. 17. 
138 See Hart, supra note 131, at 2. 
139 See Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, An ICIJ Investigation The Panama Papers: Exposing the Rogue 
Offshore Finance Industry, passim (Jan. 31, 2017),  https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/ ( a 
collection of separate reports focused on methods or individuals using the services of the defunct Panamanian law 
firm, Mossack Fonseca, to assist in hiding or protecting from taxes profits from many sources) [hereinafter “ICIJ 
Panama Papers Investigation”]. 
140 See Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, An ICIJ Investigation Paradise Papers: Secrets of the Global Elite 
– The Long Twilight Struggle Against Offshore Secrecy, passim, Nov. 5, 2017, 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/ (a collection of separate reports focused on persons using 
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These disclosures appear to have relied on whistleblowers, rather than original law enforcement 
investigations. The databases of records from each leak reveal a staggering global capacity to hide funds 
and other assets through placement and layering by professionals.141  There are no data of which I am 
aware that suggest what percentage may be conducted using some form of blockchain technology.  
Where do permission-less blockchains fit into the three-stage schema employed by money-
laundering professionals? Well, in many respects, they are available tools—but they are not yet fully 
operational for complete transformation into legitimate-appearing assets. Permission-less blockchains 
lack the centralized management or responsible parties that can be subjected to these “four R’s in 
themselves,” because the Four R’s regimes depend on having some personal or legal entity to regulate. 
However, in commerce, not all sellers of physical assets will accept cryptocurrencies or crypto assets for 
their goods or services. For this reason, unless we anticipate economies in which those who use 
permission-less blockchain transactions for the purpose of obscurity and never need access to fiat 
currency or current financial intermediaries to utilize or receive proceeds or other value transfers, we 
will not need to replace the Four R’s as central features of AML/CTF142 enforcement efforts.  
D. OFAC’s Enforcement of U.S. Sanctions Laws and Executive Orders  
OFAC designates nation states, commercial and financial organizations, such as banks, non-profit 
organizations and agencies of nation states, and individuals as persons with whom “U.S. persons” may 
not engage in any form of business and publishes lists of these “specially designated nationals.”143  
Of these tools for deterrence of involvement with perpetrators of money laundering, Section 311 of 
the USA Patriot Act144 is among the most powerful.  The Director of the Department of the Treasury’s 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) also has authority through a process including notice-
and-comment rulemaking to designate jurisdictions of major money laundering concern145 – with the 
result that specific entities will be banned from access to the U.S. financial system.146 These powers and 
practices have snared global banks, some in more than one investigation.147  
                                                          
services of the Bermudian law firm, Appleby, that reveal the offshoring habits of global elites) [hereinafter “ICIJ 
Paradise Papers”].  
141 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives? 38 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, passim (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2730983.  
142 For ease of reference, the term AML in this essay will stand for all AML, CTF and anti-proliferation aspects that 
deal with the movements of proceeds or payments, including those related to economic sanctions imposed by the 
United States. 
143 U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Controls, Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List 
(SDN), (updated to April 26, 2019), www.treasury.gov/pages (list of individuals and companies owned or controlled 
by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries, or who are narcotics “kingpins”).  
144 31 U.S.C. § 5318A.  
145 Id. 
146 E.g., U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enf. Network, Imposition of Special Measures Against FBME Bank Ltd., 
Formerly Known as the Federal Bank of the Middle East Ltd., as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering 
Concern, 80 Fed. Reg. 45057 (July 29, 2015) (notice of finding and imposition of special measures using FinCEN’s 
authority under 31 C.F.R. Part 1010 against a bank with offices in Tanzania and Cyprus with alleged ties to Russia).  
147 E.g., Standard Chartered Bank, HSBC, and others. 
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Remedies that may be imposed for violations include asset freezes and forfeitures, criminal 
penalties on individuals and organizations, designations of individuals, organizations, government 
agencies, and property (particularly vessels) as prohibited for “U.S. persons” to engage with. 
Since Congress passed the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992,148 anti-money-
laundering compliance requirements have increased significantly.  Some of these new tools apply to 
banks and non-bank financial institutions, including some nonbank actors such as “money services 
businesses.”149 Others require record-keeping and threshold-based transaction reporting by persons 
engaged in trades or business,150 such as sellers of motor vehicles and luxury goods. FinCEN has issued 
guidance on the application to cryptocurrency products and industry participants since March 2013151 
and working with other federal agencies has brought most of the enforcement actions since 2013 
described in this part of this essay.   
These AML tools may seem old-fashioned in their reliance on information provided by financial 
intermediaries to ferret out money launderers and new methods, but we found from the Panama 
Papers152 and Paradise Papers153 investigations that they remain powerful tools, for example, enabling 
New York State’s Department of Financial Services to demand from banks it supervises information on 
shell companies, customers, and transactions.154  
E. Permission-less Blockchains Are Not the Major Issue in Tracing Placement and Laying of Illicit 
Proceeds – Identification of an Entity to Regulate Is 
                                                          
148 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(2) (2018). 
149 See 31 C.F.R Parts 1010 (definitions of seller of prepaid access and “money services businesses”) and 1022 (rules 
for “Money Services Businesses”) (2018) [hereinafter “2011 Prepaid Access Regulations”]. For additional 
information on this 2011 final rule, see U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Fin. Crimes Enf. Net., Bank Secrecy Act Regulations – 
Definitions and Other Regulations relating to Prepaid Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45403 (July 29, 2011). 
150 26 U.S.C. § 6050l (2018) (requiring records of the receipt of cash or currency of $10,000 or more in one or more 
“related transactions” in a calendar year, annual notices to customers whose use of cash exceeds the threshold, 
and annual reports to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service of personally identifiable information pertaining to those 
customers and of transaction details).  Note that this requirement is codified in the revenue title, not the Bank 
Secrecy Act title of the U.S. Code.  There is some overlap between the title 26 USC provisions and the title 31 USC 
provisions.  For example, jewelers have record-keeping responsibilities to enable them to make title 26 reports and 
notices, and also to have title 31 anti-money-laundering compliance and customer-identification programs in place 
and refreshed as any change in the business model, customers, or other risk factors may require.  
151 Fin. Crimes Enf. Net., U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, 
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, FIN-2013-G001, March 18, 2013,  www.fincen.gov [hereinafter “FinCEN 
March 2013 Guidance”]. 
152 See Luke Harding, What are the Panama Papers? A guide to history’s biggest data leak, THEGUARDIAN.COM 
(April 5, 2016 10:42 BST), www.theguardian.com (reporting on a data breach affecting 11.5 million files from the 
offices of the world’s biggest offshore law firm, Mossack Fonseca, that highlighted the range of activities, assets, 
and identities of its clients, including those of government leaders in Russia, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Iceland, among 
others, leaked to investigative reporters).  
153 Nick Hopkins and Helena Bengtsson, What are the Paradise Papers and what do they tell us, 
THEGUARDIAN.COM (November 5, 2017 18:00 GMT), www.theguardian.com (describing the leak of 13.4 million 
files, 6.8 million of which relate to Appleby, a law firm in Bermuda now called Estera, from 1993 to 2014 that 
detailed money flows into offshore centers on behalf of an exclusive clientele from the United States, United 
Kingdown, Hong Kong and China, also leaked to investigative journalists).  
154 https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/20160420-ny-banks-regulator/.  
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As law enforcement agencies and financial regulators have succeeded in limiting access by 
money launderers to banks and other types of regulated financial services providers, the concern has 
been that professional money launderers will shift their efforts to other methods. Among the obvious 
methods to which these professionals may turn or already are turning are cryptocurrency and 
permission-less blockchain transactions.155  
Many AML laws and international agreements and enforcement protocols rely on four legal 
cornerstones associated with traditional financial services “gatekeepers.” These four cornerstones are: 
registration (or licensure), regulation, record-keeping, and (transaction) reporting. This essay will refer 
to these four as “the Four Rs.” These four apply to regulated depository and non-depository providers of 
financial services.  U.S. entities serving as financial services gatekeepers currently include banks, trust 
companies, credit unions, securities broker-dealers, money transmitters such as Western Union and 
other money services businesses.  Some virtual-currency businesses are in this group themselves.  
Others, not yet subject to the Four Rs themselves, or their customers, likely will use services that 
gatekeepers provide when they seek to exchange virtual currency or other crypto or digital assets for 
fiat currency or need fiat currency to complete a transaction to purchase real- or digital-world goods or 
services.     
VI. Global Anti-Money-Laundering Tools and Remedies; FATF’s 2018 and 2019 Guidance and 
Recommendations 
This Part of this essay describes various global AML initiatives that have implications for 
cryptocurrencies and other crypto assets.  These include policies developed by the Financial Action Task 
Force (“FATF”). 
The FATF has defined “virtual currency” as: 
Virtual currency is a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and 
functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store 
of value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a 
valid and legal offer of payment in any jurisdiction. It is not issued or guaranteed by any 
jurisdiction, and fulfills the above functions only by agreement within the community of 
users of the virtual currency.  Virtual currency is distinguished from fiat currency (a.k.a. 
“real currency,” “real money,” or “national currency”), which is the coin and paper 
money of a country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; and is customarily 
used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the issuing country.  It is distinct from e-
money, which is a digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer 
value denominated in fiat currency.  E-money is a digital transfer mechanism to fiat 
currency – i.e., it electronically transfers value that has legal tender status. (bold font 
original; punctuation maintained; footnotes omitted)156 
                                                          
155 For additional information about prior cryptocurrencies and issues related to some of the more notorious  
problems with providers, see Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, 
Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2393537.  
156 FATF, Key Definitions and Potential AML/CTF Risks, at 4 (2014), http://www.fatf-
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Thus, if oil-backed or gold-backed, cryptocurrencies backed by sovereigns – Venezuela, Russia, or China -
- are deemed “legal tender” by their sponsors, they will cease to be “virtual currency” under FATF’s 
definition. However, they will become “property” subject to capital-gains-tax treatment under IRS’s 
2014 guidance.157  
FATF has focused on enhancing global procedures for identifying and prosecuting persons and 
entities engaged in money laundering, terrorist finance, and weapons proliferation for some time.  Over 
the past two years, FATF has amended its Recommendations including new provisions in its October 
2018 amendments to Recommendation 15158 and the February 2019 Draft Interpretive Note to FATF 
Recommendation 15,159 and its February 2018 Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing.160 In April 
2019, FATF published additional guidance on cryptocurrencies. 161  
FATF should not abandon efforts to obtain stronger detection and enforcement tools aimed at 
what this essay has called the “Four R’s” – registration or licensure, regulation, record-keeping, and 
transactional reporting – which are all features of its October 2018 Recommendations that urge 
member states to enact and use economic sanctions against persons committing or facilitating money 
laundering, terrorism finance, and WMD proliferation.162 These tools require a central management or 
responsible person or entity on which to focus this type of regulatory requirements – the very attributes 
that permission-less blockchains lack. Instead, FATF should continue to focus on entities already subject 
to the “Four R’s” to observe value flowing from public permission-less blockchains into the hands of 
regulated assets such as bank deposits, securities, commodities, or other tangible assets. 
Demonstrating commitment to dealing with cryptocurrencies and intermediaries that those 
transferring cryptocurrencies to others or exchanging fiat currencies for cryptocurrencies or vice versa, 
in June 2019, FATF adopted and issued the February 2019 guidance mentioned above. This new 
guidance took for the form of Interpretative Note to Recommendation 15 on New Technologies (also 
known as “INR. 15”).  This Interpretative Note 15 is intended to bind FATF member nations and virtual 
currency asset providers (“VASPs”), as well as other entities that “engage in or provide virtual asset 
products and services,” to extend their AML/CTF “preventive measures” described under FATF 
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at § 103(a)(24) (relying on FATF’s definition, the URVCBA uses a similar method to distinguish between “virtual 
currency” and currency or foreign exchange). [Readers should recall my disclaimer that I served as the Reporter for 
this Uniform Law Commission project.] 
158 FATF Recommendation 15 October 2018, supra note 1.  
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Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 2018, www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/guidance-counter-
proliferation-financing.html. 
161 FATF April 2019 Recommendations, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fatf/publications/fatfgeneral. 
162 FATF 2018 Recommendations, supra note 159, passim.  
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Recommendations.163 Among the “full range” of AML/CTF measures, FATF included in its June 2019 
Interpretative Note 15 are:  
. . . customer due diligence, record-keeping, suspicious transaction reporting, and 
screening all transactions for compliance with targeted financial sanctions, among other 
measures, just like other entities subject to AML/CTF regulation. 164 
In addition, FATF’s full range of supervisory recommendations for nation state members includes 
ongoing risk-based assessments and mitigation of risks associated with virtual assets, licensure or 
registration requirements, and supervision or monitoring of VASP and other providers by “competent 
national authorities.”165  
Also, at its June 2019 Plenary Session, FATF published updated guidance entitled “Guidance for a Risk-
Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers,” which FATF described as “building 
upon FATF’s ground-breaking 2015 guidance paper.”166  The new guidance document may be found at 
fatf-gafi.org.  
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations: Public Permission-less Blockchain Transactions 
Present New Challenges and Offer New Opportunities to Regulators and Law Enforcement 
Agencies 
The themes I have used in this essay were aimed at finding ways to engage in “smart regulation,” as 
Professors Vartanian and Ledig framed their May 2019 Public Policy Conference.  I have come to them 
though a longer journey than I expected when they first contacted me. Early on, I was concerned that 
public, permission-less blockchains and transactions recorded on them would damage AML efforts and 
enforcement tools that the United States and other nations with major money centers have enacted or 
implemented.  Later, the fact that blockchains cannot be “corrected or erased” caused a change in my 
approach. I now view public permission-less blockchains as a valuable part of a robust AML enforcement 
toolkit, rather than an absolute obstacle to the achievement of AML goals. 
This is not to say that domestic and global efforts of deterrence and detection will not need to 
be changed to meet new challenges arising from blockchain-based systems. This is likely, in part, 
because blockchain-based transactions are likely to displace traditional, centrally managed forms of 
value storage and execution of value transfers, with various depositories and transaction executors such 
as trust companies, safety-deposit companies, and banks or regulated/licensed non-bank providers of 
financial services.  As these permission-less technologies continue to advance, they may enable value 
transfers more generally to move to spaces farther from the gatekeepers subject to the “Four R’s,” the 
term I have used in this essay to capture the four basic regulatory requirements that the United States, 
the European Union’s AMLD5, and FATF’s 2018 and 2019 Recommendations impose: regulation or 
licensure, regulation, record creation and maintenance requirements, and threshold-based transaction 
reporting, including of transactions that strike the provider or counter-party as “suspicious.” 
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This shift towards less transparent cryptocurrencies and away from longer-available 
cryptocurrencies that may be regulated similarly to legacy money transmitters are can be seen in crypto 
products such as Monero.167  Monero promises its users that its product is a “digital currency that is 
secure, private, and untraceable.”168 Moreover, Monero advertises its crypto coins as “an obfuscated 
public ledger, meaning anybody can broadcast or send transactions, but no outside observer can tell the 
source, amount or destination.” Depending on how Monero is regulated—and under which 
government’s or governments’ authority it may be regulated—its product or service may fall into the 
second (low to low-middle level) or third (more serious) silos of concern I described at the outset of this 
essay.  But it clearly signals that hybrid blockchains with some public and some private attributes will be 
in the marketplace and will require new AML approaches if they do not have a central administrator or 
offer services as “exchanges.” 
The key observation in the last paragraph about Monero is the absence of the word “regulated.”  
In the U.S., if the provider is a “money services business” under FinCEN’s definition of that term, then 
specific AML requirements will be imposed on this provider and product and require it to obtain 
information from customers (in some states) and create and retain records of transactions.  Thus, an 
outside may not “observe” the “source, amount, or destination,” but Monero will be accountable for 
having and keeping information about its customers and their transactions or instructions that Monero 
will execute on their behalf? 
Public permission-less blockchains, in contrast, offer permanent, non-correctable, non-erasable 
records of transactions that are more open to view. Thus, these blockchains themselves may be seen as 
part of the toolkits that law enforcement authorities will use – rather than as an existential threat to law 
enforcement actions and governments’ AML priorities.  Nevertheless, these blockchains operate without 
central managements on which to place the Four R’s requirements or to impose civil or criminal 
sanctions. In combination with newer investigatory methods, the integrity of blockchain-based 
transactions and the audit trails they rely on already offer much assistance to private entities including 
banks and securities firms to complete risk assessments on customers and fulfill their AML detection and 
deterrence responsibilities, and, based on the enforcement actions described in the appendix to this 
essay, to law enforcement agencies.  
Recent actions against perpetrators of financial crimes and their facilitators suggest that 
governments show existing capacities to “follow the money” through cryptographic substitutes. 
Appendix 1 to this essay describes federal and state law enforcement actions addressing various types 
of crypto asset law violations.  Two more recent actions by the federal government demonstrate that 
tools to “follow the money” are available to law enforcement agencies.  The first of these actions is the 
late 2018 designation by OFAC of two Iranians that facilitated Sam-Sam ransomware-attack money 
laundering through bitcoins and, in a first, of the Iranians’ crypto-addresses as “specially designated 
nationals” list with whom “U.S. persons” are prohibited from dealing.169 
The second example of detection by law enforcement agencies in the United States involves the 
use of Executive Orders and implementing designations and regulations that the United States has used.  
These Executive Order 13827 of March 19, 2018 (“Executive Order 13827-Venezuela”) placing the “any 
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169 See text accompanying note 92, supra.  
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digital currency, digital coin, or digital token, that was issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of 
Venezuela on or after January 9, 2018, are prohibited as of the date of this order.”170 Executive Order 
13827-Venezuela demonstrates the same type of AML deterrence tool – ordering economic sanctions 
against a government and its cryptocurrency, prohibiting U.S. persons from transactions “related to, 
provid[ing] financing for, and other dealings in” digital currency, coins or tokens171 -- as OFAC used in the 
Sam-Sam ransomware case against the Iranians.  In this case, the President can deny access to U.S. 
markets to cryptocurrencies whose purposes are declared “unlawful” by national legislatures such as 
Venezuela’s National Assembly.172 
It is important to think about the ramifications of actions such as that brought by Venezuela 
against the United States in the World Trade Organization for violations of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (“GATT”)173 and General Agreement on Trade and Services (“GATS”) 
obligations in response to Executive Order 13827 and other actions taken.174 Among other things, the 
Maduro Government charged that the United States is violating GATS Article II:1.  That Article provides 
that no member will treat another member less favorably than any other nation.175 Exceptions to WTO 
obligations arise if the member maintains that their actions relate to “essential security interests,”176 
and Executive Order 13827-Venezuela explicitly references a prior declaration of a national emergency 
by the United States against Venezuela in two Executive Orders, Executive Order 13692 of March 8, 
2015177 and Executive Order 13808 of August 24, 2017.178  
The Maduro government also complained that that the United States was violating GATS Article 
XVII:1, which provides that member nations will not treat financial services and service suppliers of 
other nations less favorably than they treat similar providers in their own nations.179 Although, as I note 
below, I plan to follow this action closely, at the moment the United States can make a strong argument 
based on the fact that this provision does not apply to government-sponsored currencies or securities.  
Rather, it protects private enterprises that provide financial services or who are “service providers.” 
Additional economic sanctions offer tools more in the nature of foreign policy enforcement, 
rather than more traditional AML efforts.  For example, since April 17, 2019, the Department of the 
                                                          
170 Executive Order 13827-Venezuela, supra note 36.  
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172 Id., at preamble. 
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178 President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41155 (August 29, 2017). 
179 GATT, supra note 172.  
 30 
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has implemented additional sanctions relating to the Maduro 
government in Venezuela, or enterprises and individuals.  Specifically, on April 17, OFAC added a 
designation of Banco Central de Venezuela pursuant to Executive Order 13850, as amended by 
Executive Order 13857, “for operating in the financial sector of the Venezuela economy.”180 OFAC also 
added Banco Central de Venezuela to its “Specially Designated Nationals” list and this addition makes 
any dealings with the Central Bank off-limits to all U.S. Persons unless OFAC issues a general or specific 
license allowing certain activities in the future.181 Citing Executive Order 13850, OFAC’s designation also 
includes the Central Bank’s SWIFT/BIC BCVEVECA, and Tax ID No. G200001100182 so that transactions 
with that SWIFT account or Tax ID Number also are prohibited in the absence of a license. 
As nation states – particularly, the Russia Federation, China, and Venezuela – focus on issuing 
cryptocurrencies or tokens with the purpose of evading economic sanctions or of undermining the U.S. 
dollar’s role in the global economy, we are likely to need new legal options.  New legal options should go 
beyond the “Four R’s” that I have described in this essay. These new options must be capable of being 
taken without violating nation states’ obligations under international law or treaty obligations, but those 
obligations should not be interpreted as preventing legal remedies to thwart products or providers 
operating in my third silo, which includes fraudsters as well as rogue actors or rogue states.  I plan to 
continue to work on how the United States might approach these state-sponsored cryptocurrencies.  
Among the tools that might be ramped up to deter evasion of current or new AML/CTF efforts is the 
prospect that U.S. and other regulators will use their authority to send bad actors packing by imposition 
of special measures authorized by Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act and curtailing access by them to 
the payments systems in the United States and the trillions of USD of bank wire transfers and securities 
transactions managed by these payment systems on a daily basis.183 Another (if seldom used) tool is the 
revocation of charters of U.S.-based banks, or of licenses by other non-bank providers who aid and abet 
placement, layering, and cleansing of domestic and global financial crimes, as current U.S. law allows for 
national banks.184 
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Work by the United States, the EC, and FATF should continue to focus on known “high-risk money 
laundering jurisdictions” and to include jurisdictions that welcome blockchain-based businesses such as 
Malta or that permit blockchain businesses to operate with little accountability – those that do not 
impose licensure, regulation, record-keeping, or threshold-based reporting responsibilities. The 
European Commission’s February 13, 2019 “high-risk-jurisdiction” list -- those with lax AML regulations 
or enforcement. 185 FATF issued its recent list on February 22, 2019 and named 12 jurisdictions with 
“strategic deficiencies” in their AML/CFT programs – including The Bahamas, Botswana, Cambodia, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Pakistan, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Yemen.186 FATF 
issued a Public Statement (also on February 22, 2019) describing additional concerns.187 FATF also issued 
an Interpretive Note on Recommendation 15 dealing specifically with virtual assets.188 
The following are some additional recommendations for new legal and cross-border collaborative 
steps that the U.S. and other nations might take, perhaps with particular focus on maintaining the Four 
R’s on the higher-risk products or providers I have assigned to the third silo, including:  
1) retention by the U.S. of its current robust capacity and regulatory requirements to 
detect and deter global financial crimes and use by the providers and products in the 
third silo of U.S banking, securities, non-bank payment systems, and commodities 
trading capacities; 
2) provision of appropriate resources for FinCEN, OFAC, and other law enforcement 
agencies including funding for artificial-intelligence tools and crypto-tracing-assets 
training; 
3) retention by the U.S. of requirements for licensure as required by the States, and 
registration with FinCEN of certain providers of cryptocurrency services as “money 
services businesses;” 
4) monitoring of stablecoins, which are “cryptocurrencies linked for pricing purposes to a 
real-world asset such as the United States Dollar”;189 
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189 See Crypto ‘stablecoins’ explained: What are they, how they work, and how they’re used, 
WWW.BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (September 30, 2018).  
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5) supporting efforts by private operators of payments or payments-utilities systems such 
as SWIFT190 to create more transparency for transactions using its telecommunications 
platform, including by using new technology to deliver unaltered remittance 
information when payments occur including a unique transaction “identifier” (the 
“UETR”), with trackable and traceable, end-to-end features and requirements that 
SWIFT participants commit to anti-crime compliance and security; 
6) enhancing resources and legal tools available to foreign intelligence units – as the EC’s 
AMLD5 has proposed;191 
7) granting explicit new statutory legal authority in the United States to require 
identification of owners of specified percentages of limited liability companies,192 
including the beneficiaries of trusts,193 and working with other governments that hold 
major financial centers and the United States’ major trading partners to do the same; 194 
8) supporting new regulation like the EC’s new AMLD5195 and prompt implementation of 
their requirements following enactment as the EC’s schedule for national enactments by 
January 10, 2020 requires; 196 
9) using legal process in aid of criminal investigations across national borders via legal 
process directed at facilities globally and at cloud storage, as the U.S. achieved in its 
investigation of Liberty Reserve,197 and German investigators achieved when they 
obtained documents held by law firms inside their jurisdiction;198 
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10) deploying public-private partnerships to develop new tools to provide stronger end-of-
end traceability of blockchain-based value transfers, such as the tracking solutions and 
AMK/KYC compliance tools being developed by commercial firms;199 
11) exploring methods to enjoin uses of cloud-based services, social media, or Internet 
Service Providers by blockchain-based enterprises that may be engaged in money 
laundering;200 and, 
12) insisting that enterprises subject to the laws of the United States, European Union, and 
elsewhere comply with the Four R’s continue to verify identify their customers; create 
and maintain records of owners/customers and of transactions, including initial coin 
offerings and coin/token trading in secondary markets, and strict compliance with U.S. 
requirements enforced by OFAC.  
 The ability of the United States and its major trading partners that host major money markets to 
contain money laundering will become more important as explained by Professor Eswar S. Prasad of 
Cornell University and the Brookings Institution at the point at which “decentralized nonofficial 
cryptocurrencies … start playing a bigger role as mediums of exchange.”201 This likelihood—that I cannot 
yet call an inevitability—makes reliance on enterprises or individuals subject to the Four R’s even more 
important to future AML deterrence and detection. 
 To the extent that regulators and law enforcement agencies can continue to improve their 
investigatory tools, with proper funding, data from public permission-less blockchains will be valuable 
assets in AML detection and deterrence.  Additionally, because traditional financial intermediaries such 
as banks, broker-dealers, and other regulated financial services providers will continue to be involved 
when the beneficiaries of illicit transactions want access to fiat currencies or traditional transaction-
execution services from currently regulated entities, public permission-less blockchain transactions will 
not be the only sources of information available. To this end, we will need more widespread adoption of 
FATF’s Recommendation, including those issued in April 2019, and robust enforcement of AML laws by 
G-20 members.  Among the tools needed will be AML investigatory and enforcement authority where 
not currently in place, such as for the European Banking Authority (“EBA”).202  We also need to be 
mindful of the costs of the compliance responsibilities that the gatekeepers I have described already 
bear.  
As we proceed, I urge that Congress, regulatory agencies, law enforcement agencies, and others 
differentiate among the challenges presented by blockchain technologies generally (at the low end of 
concern from my perspective at this point), by crypto products and services including cryptocurrencies 
and tokens offered by entities in compliance with domestic laws where they do business (in the low-to-
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low-middle middle ranges of concern depending on precisely how they are regulated now and the users 
who favor them), and bad actors and opportunists (at the high end of concern because of the potential 
for user/ consumer harm and the damage these actors can cause to other innovators as well).  In this 
last category, I would include hackers and issuers of currencies and tokens that have no intention of 
allowing redemption of value exchanged or of providing any service to those who pay for it.  This 
cautious approach follows a long-held view that maintains there is little reason to regulate the already 
sufficiently regulated. In other words, I see no reason to pile regulations actors, products and services 
that are subject to and in compliance with applicable federal and state laws in the United States and our 
major trading partners. The goal of future regulatory and law enforcement attention should be to 
maintain capacity to “follow the money” trails beyond that used with traditional gatekeepers 
(intermediaries, such as banks and securities-market participants) using the “smartest” approaches we 
can devise. 
 Issues for future research include both Venezuela’s 2019 challenge at the WTO relating to U.S. 
sanctions imposed on its Petro as violating other international law and global trade agreements203 and 
the proposals by the Russia Federation to create a sovereign cryptocurrency, as described briefly in Part 
II.B., above.  Governments seeking to protect their own financial, commercial, and trade systems against 
government-sponsored cryptocurrencies designed to evade economic sanctions imposed by other 
nation states will have to consider their choice of methods in light of World Trade Organization 
responsibilities.  Whether economic sanctions directed at a government-sponsored cryptocurrency can 
be deemed to violate WTO obligations is a topic that goes beyond the assignment given to me by the 
organizers of this George Mason Financial Services Roundtable, and so this issue is saved for future 
research. I also intend, at some point, to write about sovereign-issued cryptocurrencies and national 
security/cyber-warfare issues they may pose. 
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Appendix 1  
Examples of Enforcement Actions Dealing with Providers of Cryptocurrencies or Other Crypto-
Assets 
 The following are examples going back for more than ten years that demonstrate the 
ability of federal and state law enforcement agencies to detect and prosecute persons and 
entities whose activities violate federal or state laws relevant to registration or licensure, 
creation and maintenance of records of customers and their transactions, and threshold-based 
reporting to law enforcement agencies that I reviewed while pondering the central question in 
this essay.  These are not the only examples, particularly of enterprises or persons who have 
faced scrutiny from securities and commodities regulatory agencies, but they provide a sense of 
how regulators and enforcement agencies view the seriousness of certain types of activities. 
1. Ripple Labs, Inc. and XRP II, LLC, its wholly owned subsidiary  
Ripple is the best-known of the examples of U.S. enforcement actions I have chosen to mention 
in this essay.  FinCEN brought and settled its first civil enforcement action involving a virtual currency 
exchange, securing a $700,000 civil penalty.204 FinCEN and the Department of Justice charged Ripple 
with willful violations of the Bank Secrecy Act,205 failure to register with FinCEN as a “money services 
business” (MSB), and failure to implement and maintain an anti-money-laundering compliance program 
as required for MSBs.206 The violation that FinCEN cited in its action reportedly occurred between March 
6, 2013 through April 29, 2013, which I have noted in another essay bridges the date on which FinCEN 
issued its first guidance on virtual currency providers as “money services businesses.” 
2. BTC-e and Alexander Vinnik 
In July 2017, the Department of Justice announced the indictment of BTC-e, AKA Canton 
Business Corporation, and its alleged founder, a Russian national Alexander Vinnik, for operating an 
unlicensed money services business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960, engaging in money laundering and a 
conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1) and 1956(h), and 
additional unlawful monetary transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.  The Department also sought 
criminal forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §982(a)(1).207  The Superseding Indictment alleged that BTC-e 
“was an international money-laundering scheme … that facilitated crimes, including computer hacking 
and ransomware, fraud, identity theft, tax refund fraud schemes, public corruption, and drug 
trafficking.”208   
Besides operating as an unlicensed money services business, the indictment charged that BTC-e 
“lacked basic anti-money laundering controls and policies and, as such was attractive to those who 
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desired to conceal criminal proceeds as it made it more difficult for law enforcement to trace and 
attribute funds.”209 BTC-e allegedly did not require basic identifying customer information (e.g., name, 
date of birth, address, or other identifiers) on account opening, and required only a user name, 
password, and an email address.210  
The indictment also charged that, although based abroad, BTC-e operated its servers inside the 
United States and did substantial amounts of business in the United States.211  In addition to potential 
criminal penalties, on July 26, 2017, FinCEN assessed a civil penalty of $110 million against BTC-e, and a 
civil penalty of $12 million against Vinnik.212 
3. Liberty Reserve 
Liberty Reserve was an online, centralized digital-currency exchange213 based in Costa Rica, 
alleged to have laundered approximately $6 billion in criminal proceeds.214 On May 28, 2013, the U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York unsealed a criminal indictment against Liberty Reserve 
and certain principals and employees for operating an unlicensed money transmission business and 
engaging in money laundering.215 Liberty Reserve went out of business following this indictment and 
prior to the entry of a guilty plea by its founder, Arthur Budovsky.216  
This is the only one of two examples of federal enforcement actions against virtual-currency 
providers whose headquarters were outside the US at the time of the action.  The other was against 
BTC-e, discussed above. For purposes of later discussion, the jurisdictional hooks with BTC-e and Liberty 
Reserve involved assets (servers) or customers inside the United States proper. A purely extraterritorial 
application of U.S. laws did not arise in either case. From these actions and settlements, we can see that 
the U.S. intends to apply its anti-money-laundering requirements to money services businesses that are 
located abroad but do business in the United States.  Whether this will suffice to keep providers using 
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permission-less blockchain technologies with neither customers nor servers or agents in the United 
States is not yet clear.  
 Another important aspect of the prosecution of Liberty Reserve and Budovsky was the 
admission in the plea agreement that Liberty Reserve had 600,000 accounts associated with users in the 
United States and had laundered more than $250 million on a worldwide basis.217 This dollar value 
places Liberty Reserve’s effect on global money laundering above the amount now known about Danske 
Bank’s Estonia branch, as described above.  
4. E-Gold, Ltd.  
One of the earliest actions to involve a provider of virtual-assets products and services – one 
preceding both FinCEN’s 2011 regulation on “prepaid access” and its March 2013 guidance on Virtual 
Currencies under the 2011 regulation -- was brought against an online provider known as e-Gold, Ltd. E-
Gold was a digital currency backed by gold.  The digital assets marketed by defendants preceded Bitcoin.  
E-Gold allowed its customers to open accounts anonymously and its services enabled fast cross-border 
transfers of value.218 The action, filed in 2008, followed a return from a civil seizure warrant.219 
Defendant e-Gold, Ltd. challenged the seizure on grounds that it violated its Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights.  A federal district court ruled in the government’s favor. The United States Courts of Appeal for 
the D.C. Circuit, however, agreed with the e-Gold and individuals who were officers or shareholders in 
the firm that their rights had been violated.220 The methods that led investigators to e-Gold, Ltd. are 
described in the Complaint.221 
With a transaction volume that made it second to PayPal on a global basis at that time, e-Gold 
attracted bad actors and government investigators.222 US regulators and the DOJ sought to force e-Gold, 
Ltd. to register with FinCEN as a “money transmitter” – a classification that, apparently, e-Gold thought 
was not applicable to its business model because it allowed customers to store value, in much the same 
manner as banks’ customers store value with banks.223 E-Gold, it turned out, had become the vehicle for 
“carders” – enterprises that collected and sold information from stolen credit cards and extracted 
payments, much like ransomware attacks today, and was aiding the carders in moving significant 
amounts around the world.224  
5. Other Enforcement Actions Brought against Unlicensed Money Transmitters or Those Not 
Registered with FinCEN 
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There are numerous examples of enforcement actions brought against unlicensed money 
transmitters or those not registered with FinCEN as being engaged in “money services businesses.”  For 
the purposes of this essay, however, I will offer only brief comments on a few of the earlier enforcement 
actions so that audience members get the flavor of the actions. These actions represent a combination 
of higher-tech and old-fashioned investigatory work, which is likely to remain the approach used to 
ferret out illicit proceeds on permission-less blockchains. 
a. Mutum Sigillum, LLC Account Seized from Dwolla 
Shortly before the Liberty Reserve indictment was unsealed, on May 14, 2013, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) obtained a seizure warrant ordering the seizure and 
forfeiture of an account belonging to Mutum Sigillum, LLC.225 An affidavit filed in connection with the 
application for the seizure warrant stated that Mutum Sigillum LLC was a U.S.-based subsidiary of Mt. 
Gox, a large Bitcoin exchange based in Japan.226  Based on information allegedly from an informat, DHS 
alleged that Mutum Sigillum was engaged in “money transmission” without holding a license as a money 
transmitter and so should have been, but was not registered with FinCEN in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 
5330, and that Mt. Gox, the parent company, was operating in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1960.227 Following 
these actions, Mt. Gox announced that it would institute a new policy that required identity verification 
before it would allow currency withdrawals or deposits,228 a policy announcement that implies that no 
such identification information had been required previously.  
b. United States v. Murgio 
Another of the early enforcement actions was brought against Anthony Murgio for operating an 
unlicensed online currency exchange – a money transmitting business under FinCEN’s March 2013 
guidance -- in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960.229 Additional charges included conspiracy, money 
laundering, and failure to file a suspicious activity report, which is required of providers of prepaid 
access and others engaged in activities that make them “financial institutions” for purposes of the AML 
requirements in U.S. laws.230 Moreover, the complaint charged that Murgio and co-conspirators were 
alleged to have knowingly facilitated “ransomware” attacks, for which the victim is asked to pay the 
ransom in a virtual currency such as bitcoins.231 Victims approached Murgio’s exchange, known as 
coin.mx, to acquire the bitcoins used to pay ransoms, which the exchange provided. The exchange was 
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accused to failing to file the suspicious activity report on the perpetrator or recipient of the bitcoins it 
provided to the victim.232  
The complaint also alleged a more concerning fact about Murgio’s scheme: that Murgio had 
acquired beneficial ownership of a small credit union in New Jersey and had used or planned to use the 
credit union to access electronic payments networks in order to support other illegal activities.233 The 
risks presented by direct access to payments networks makes this action against Murgio and co-
conspirators unique among the U.S. enforcement actions of which I am aware. 
c. State v. Espinoza 
The third example does not involve federal law enforcement agencies, but rather state charges 
against a man accused in 2013 of selling bitcoins directly for cash in Florida.234  It also results from online 
surveillance by law enforcement agencies.235 This matter has current utility because, on January 30, 
2019, the Third District Court of Appeals in Florida held236 that selling bitcoins directly to another person 
qualifies as “money transmission”237 under Florida’s money transmitter statute.238 In addition to 
reviewing the basis for Florida’s position that bitcoin is covered by the definition of “payment 
instrument,”239 the court explained its view that the two-party transactions in which Espinoza sold 
bitcoins for cash to individuals still constituted “money transmission” under the statute.240 This 
reasoning depends on the court’s view that Espinoza received cash in order to transmit virtual currency 
to the person that paid the cash.241 (In contract, FinCEN’s position has been that “money transmission” 
of virtual currencies occurs when an intermediary sends value from one person to another242 or sends 
value owned by one person from one location to another location.243) 
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